Thomas Hobbes on the Aristocracy of Passion

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Nothing would seem to be further from Hobbes’s psychology of man than the notion of an aristocratic soul. He is widely considered the first of the bourgeois philosophers. As for an aristocratic soul itself—the magnanimous man of Aristotle, for instance—Hobbes had many reasons to be hostile to this idea. The very notion of a great man, as someone above the common herd, presented a danger to his entire political project because that man was motivated by pride. A proud man might consider himself immune to danger and thus not be motivated by the fear of violent death. And without that fear, how can civil society hold itself together? Curiously, Hobbes did suggest that there is an aristocratic alternative to fear, namely “a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break” one’s contract. And so it seems the aristocratic soul does exist. All that Hobbes could say against it in this context is that it is “too rarely found to be presumed on.” And so what should appear to be a theoretical possibility, the aristocratic soul, turns out to be only a practical problem. Or so it seems.

This paper will explore the idea of aristocracy in the work of Thomas Hobbes from both a political and a psychological perspective, for the two are largely inseparable. I first consider the phenomenon of aristocracy at a general level before turning to Hobbes’s thoughts on it. I do this to show that he had a unique perspective on the problems of aristocracy. I then explore Michael Oakeshott’s suggestion that there can be found an “aristocratic mood” in Hobbes’s work. This is followed by what I describe as Hobbes’s replacement of the classical aristocracy of virtue with his own aristocracy of passion. I conclude with a few thoughts on the cultural benefits of such an aristocracy and its political dangers.
Aristocracy as rule by the best has always been a tempting possibility. Plato’s Socrates claimed that one of the most compelling reasons to rule is that the wise man would not be ruled by an inferior. But aristocracy also promises both competent government and an escape from the concerns of governing. As to the latter, the wisdom of Homer Simpson must be cited on this point. In one episode he explains to his daughter, “Lisa, the whole reason we have elected officials is so we don’t have to think all the time.”

The Homeric perspective of this comment is exactly what Rousseau opposed when he wrote “On the Social Contract.” But few really want to be Rousseauian citizens, flying to the assembly each day. As Pierre Manent has explained, the political energies of the ancient Greek democracies burnt themselves out in the Peloponnesian war, as did the French energies in its revolutionary wars.

Far better to leave this work to others while we get along with our lives. The success of the progressive movement in the twentieth century owes no small part to the same sentiment. Expertise and competence are virtues in the running of a complex, modern state. While this might run the risk of confusing meritocracy with aristocracy, the ambiguity is as old as the treatments of Plato and Aristotle. Socrates described the star-gazing philosopher as the best pilot of the ship of state, and Aristotle argued that only those with sufficient leisure could cultivate the virtues necessary for rule.

The standard objections to aristocracy are threefold. The first problem is how to identify the initial group of aristocrats. Who stands out as better than all the rest? Who can be trusted with such power? One of the fundamental problems every political society faces, and one that the state of nature theorists described so vividly, is that there is no clear way of identifying natural rulers. Even those outstanding figures whom we might consider to have the unambiguous qualities of leadership—George Washington and Winston Churchill come to mind—were not universally considered the natural rulers they are today. Washington still had to fight the Revolutionary war and convince the Continental Congress to supply his needs; Churchill was denied the office he so craved until the last moment. Yet this objection, the problem of identification, is a practical one. It does not deny the existence of aristocratic souls who are natural rulers. It simply says it is difficult to find them in the first instance.

The second objection to aristocracy is also a practical one, yet no less important. As described in Plato’s Republic, regimes degenerate when subsequent generations do not have the virtues of the founding aristocrats. Even if we could find natural rulers at the founding of the state, it is not clear that their progeny will have the same qualities. The wastrel son is cliché from ancient warrior cultures to modern business. Yet it is not even clear that the first generation, the aristocrats, want their progeny to follow them. In a
telling passage in a letter from John Adams to Abigail, one of those founders of a new order for the ages, he described his hope that their sons would not be men like himself and would not be engaged in politics, and this even more the case for successive generations. He hoped for a succession of generations that moved further and further away from the concerns that so dominated his life and have made him a figure of fascination and even veneration.

The third standard objection to aristocracy is that it seems incapable of discovering suitable candidates from outside the official lists. While also a practical problem, this one is concerned not so much with the quality of rule is with the fairness or justice, or rather injustice, of excluding those who should be included within the aristocracy. Again, Plato’s Republic is the classical expression of this concern and also of the unwieldy mechanisms that would be required to address it. Of course, the modern political world has come up with its own means of addressing it, namely, through elections. Although few today would understand how the ancient Greeks were able to consider elections fundamentally aristocratic, the claim of the candidates and their supporters is always based on rank, that is, better and worse, the very language of aristocracy. Ironically, then, modern representative democracy resolves the problem of aristocracy by re-creating it in a roundabout way. The epistolary conversation between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson is a good example of how this is done. Although separated by significant differences on the matter, they both believed that there was a natural aristocracy to be found among the American people and that the institutions of government had to be designed in such a way as to find them out. And so the author of the Declaration of Independence and the author of the Constitution of Massachusetts late in life supported the American Revolution for its ability to address this third problem with aristocracy.

HOBBS AGAINST THE ARISTOCRACY

Although Hobbes preferred monarchy above all other forms of government, there are places in which it is clear that he was open to both aristocracy and democracy. His preference for monarchy was more practical than theoretical, it being his concern that the most significant problem in governments is not that the wrong decision might be made but that a sufficiently large number of people would argue about any decision. The so-called Ship Money Controversy that preceded the English Civil War is a good case in point. According to the laws of England the crown could impose a special tax throughout the country for the purpose of outfitting the Navy. Charles I tried to exercise this right in 1628 and, although the Commons was prorogued, the people objected. In themselves, the objections to the ship money might not have led to the Civil War. However, Hobbes believed that they did give a pretext for
other, unstated complaints against the King and, indeed, against monarchy in general. Whether it was the final straw or a rallying point, it is true that in politics unlikely events often cause greater ones. On Hobbes’s telling, the English Civil War was caused by people believing they had a right to object to the decisions of the king. They were strengthened in this belief by the existence of Parliament, an institution dedicated, it would have seemed to Hobbes, to frustrating the king. As Michael Walzer put it, “The good aristocrat indeed consents to the laws he obeys; that is why he obeys them; but he has at the same time nothing to say about their substance.”

According to Hobbes, almost all political opposition can be traced back to pride. Civil wars do not arise from people simply having different ideas. They arise when people think that their ideas about government or policy are as good as or better than those of the duly appointed rulers. But why should anybody think that? Pride. His whole science of politics points to the creation of the great Leviathan, that which will overawe the people and, referring to the book of Job, will be “king over the children of pride.” Pride is the great enemy of the Leviathan because it undercuts the very mechanism of obedience. The Hobbesian state is supposed to work not because the sovereign always reaches the right conclusion or chooses the best policy. That is too much to ask of human politics. Rather, the Hobbesian state works when everyone obeys the sovereign, right or wrong. Indeed, there is no right or wrong except for what the sovereign says, according to Hobbes. To presume to apply those terms—right and wrong—to anything the sovereign might do is to place oneself in a position of judgement above the sovereign. And what is this other than pride?

It is no accident that however much each of his various lists of the laws of nature might vary, one from another, they always include a law against pride. This is significant because it reveals Hobbes’s theoretical objections to aristocracy as opposed to the practical objections considered earlier. Recall, the three objections revolve around finding an initial group of aristocrats, sustaining their qualities through subsequent generations, and including qualified people from outside the initial list. Nowhere did Hobbes deny that these are problems. He was as aware of them is anyone. Instead, he would suggest that these three problems arise precisely because of pride. They are practical problems only because of this underlying theoretical or psychological problem. Everyone values himself higher than he does his fellows. Therefore, everyone wants to be counted among the aristocrats or, if not everyone, far too many to fit within their ranks. And this is not an unreasonable ambition. Not only are the rewards of being an aristocrat far greater than those of being an average citizen, Hobbes told us that the distinctions of rank are arbitrary: “The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequality that now is, has bin introduced by the Lawes civill.” If it is arbitrary
who will be the lord of the manor or the serf, then what rational person would not want to be at the top? And so the vanity or pride that creates the initial problem becomes contagious. Even people who might not have started with it soon acquire it.

Having lived in two countries characterized by the pathology of pride, Hobbes could see that any civil society that relies upon this is inherently unstable. As he wrote in *De Cive*, “no large or lasting society can be based upon the passion for glory. The reason is that glorying, like honour, is nothing if everybody has it, since it consists in comparison and preemience.”

Any society based upon a zero-sum game is setting up conflict. According to Julie Cooper, “By Hobbes’s admission, laws of honor may frustrate the end for which they were established—namely, peace—for they are liable to exacerbate, rather than redirect, the passion of vainglory.” Moreover, such hierarchies can never be entirely rigid for they must always, and do always, permit new members to enter. Where the rewards for entry are so great, as I have stated, there are countless political and psychological incentives for each individual to rise into the ranks of the aristocracy. Aristocracy is nothing but a problem.

There seems to be one exception to this problem of aristocracy, as many commentators have pointed out, namely Sidney Godolphin. Godolphin died early in the Civil Wars fighting for the Royalist cause and Hobbes dedicated *Leviathan* to his brother, Francis. The character of Sidney enters into a discussion of aristocracy because Hobbes praised him in both the Epistle Dedicatory and the Review and Conclusion to *Leviathan*. Accordingly, Hobbes wrote, “For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.”

In the last few pages of his great book, Hobbes used the example of his late friend as evidence that there is “no such Inconsistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think.” Did Sidney Godolphin allow Hobbes to square the circle of aristocracy as he would shortly claim but fail to do in geometry?

Godolphin—either one, but especially Sidney—was a very unusual dedicatee for Hobbes. As Richard Tuck points out, Hobbes was trying to accommodate himself to the new powers in England in his “Review and Conclusion.” Choosing to dedicate the book to a prominent Royalist would seem to be a mistake. Clarendon noted this and concluded that Hobbes chose to dedicate the book in order to secure the £200 bequest from Sidney that Francis had not yet paid. John T. Scott has given the question of Hobbes’s relationship to Godolphin sustained attention, framing it in terms of friendship rather than aristocracy. Nevertheless, his work is significant for drawing attention to the fact that Hobbes praised his late friend for the “quite un-
Hobbesian virtues of courage and friendship.” Scott’s conclusion is that, “Godolphin’s loyalty to the king and his friendship for Hobbes seem to transcend the vision of human nature Hobbes offers in his work.” While I am inclined to agree with Scott about Hobbes’s vision of human nature, and I do not doubt their friendship, I am not convinced that Godolphin rises to the level of an aristocratic soul. Hobbes’s description of the man is sufficiently bourgeois to prevent that. What he was, significantly, was a poet. I shall return to this below.

HOBBES AND THE FEW

Michael Oakeshott has argued that Thomas Hobbes had, even if he did not fully develop it, an aristocratic mood in his argument. He described it as an idiom of morality that was appropriate to creatures “more properly concerned with honour than with either survival or prosperity.” Oakeshott’s argument, which he admitted was speculative, would put Hobbes in a line of thought shared with Spinoza and Hume wherein pride or self-esteem is enough to bring men to heel. He based his argument upon a few scattered but very important passages in Leviathan. The first concerns Hobbes’s explanation for why men might perform their covenants: “either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to break it.” In the subsequent chapter Hobbes explained, “That which gives to humane Actions their relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantness of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise.” The last of the three comments, coming from chapter 27 of Leviathan, has Hobbes arguing that above all other passions fear is the one that prevents men from committing crimes, “accepting some generous natures.” Who are these generous natures? They certainly seem to be the same ones who would perform their contracts because of glory or pride and thereby attain that nobleness or gallantness of courage. If there is such thing as an aristocratic soul in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes it is to be found in these passages.

According to Oakeshott, and I certainly agree with him on this, Hobbes’s problem is that there are not enough of these aristocratic souls to form a stable Commonwealth. Certainly, if enough men were so concerned with their honor that they would never break their covenants, everyone else could perform theirs without fear of the consequences of nonperformance on the part of the other. He addressed exactly this possibility:

For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then
James Madison would later make the same argument, if more poetically, in Federalist 51: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." Unfortunately, and in Hobbes own words, "this later is a Generosity to rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensual Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind." Where I cannot follow Oakeshott is his next step, in which he attempts to explain this most recent passage from Hobbes in the following way: "In short, Hobbes perceived that men lack passion rather than reason, and lack, above all, this passion." This goes too far. I must, instead, agree with Gabriella Slomp that, "in all his political writings Hobbes regards desire of glory either as the only or at least as one of the chief destabilizing forces in human interactions."

On the one hand, readers of Hobbes could agree that were pride instead of fear the passion that could most easily be relied upon to enforce contracts, Hobbes would have used that in his argument. And yet, as even Oakeshott must admit, he did not do so. Hobbes consistently advocated the use of fear to motivate the enforcement of covenants rather than pride. Yes, there does seem to be some small indication, or perhaps an indication of some small number, of aristocratic souls—and we owe a debt to Oakeshott for drawing this to our attention. It does not follow, however, that the smallness of their number is the only problem in appealing to their pride. Oakeshott’s presentation of these proud and gallant men who would keep their covenants as a matter of honor, while very much in line with Hobbes’s own presentation of them in the three passages cited, is lifeless. Pride here is an easy-going self-confidence. It is more akin to self-esteem as we might use it now. Nevertheless, Oakeshott seems to have confused the state of nature and the state of seminar, not unlike Rawls would do later. The children of this kind of pride would never need a king over them for they would be able to govern themselves.

Despite my disagreement with Oakeshott’s analysis, he points to a very important and perhaps new understanding of aristocracy. When I addressed the issue above and in terms of the classical tradition, aristocrats deserve the title of “the best” from their virtues, whether moral or intellectual. What Oakeshott draws to our attention, instead, is an aristocracy of passion. That is, cognitive and moral superiority is not an issue; rather, passion or the balance of various passions one against the other makes aristocrats. Again, while I do not agree with Oakeshott’s suggestion that pride is a better enforcer of contracts than fear, or even to imagine such a thing within Hobbes’s
philosophy, I do think the aristocracy of passion is an important way to understand how Hobbes might have conceived of an aristocratic soul.

THE ARISTOCRACY OF PASSION

It is generally accepted, and rightly so, that the concept of a soul is incompatible with Hobbes’s materialist, mechanistic philosophy. He famously dismissed the notion that the human soul is an incorporeal body with the suggestion that it is really a “thin æreal” body. At several points in *Leviathan* he argued that every reference to the soul in Scripture was merely a reference to life, the activity or presence of life, rather than to any particular or separate thing in itself. The only place in his work where the soul meant anything real was when he used it as an analogy for the sovereign in the state. In his extended analogy in the Introduction to *Leviathan* he wrote that “Sovereignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.” But there is no such thing, as far as I can find in his work, as a natural soul. Instead, in place of a unified soul animating the human being, Hobbes argued that the passions fill this role.

In chapter 6 of *Leviathan*, “Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the Passions. And the Speeches by which they are expressed,” Hobbes took what were for him curiously tentative steps towards the conclusion that all interior motions begin with the passions. First, he stated that “the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion.” Then he explained that the small beginnings of motion within the human person are called endeavor. Endeavor is divided into the positive (appetite or desire), or the negative (aversion). These are further subdivided. Only later in the chapter are they clearly identified as passions. He wrote, “These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Griefe, have their names for diverse conditions diversified.” The significance of the passions for our topic of aristocracy and the aristocratic soul can be found in chapter 8 of *Leviathan*.

According to Hobbes, natural intelligence consists of two parts, namely, “Celerity of Imagining,” and “steddy direction to some approved end.” This echoes a parallel passage from the *Elements of Law*, in which he wrote, “The difference therefore of wits hath its original from the different passions, and from the ends to which their appetite leadeth them.” Any distinction we might ascribe to an aristocratic soul, such as superior virtue or intelligence, are to be found in the peculiar object or vehemence of the individual’s passions. More precisely, “The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, principally, the more or less Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but several sorts of Power.”
The continuation of this line of thought in the next paragraph is especially instructive. Hobbes continued, “And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offense; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgment.” If there is ever to be found an aristocratic mood in Hobbes’s philosophy, as Oakeshott put it, it is here. Not only did Hobbes identify greatness with great passion, he identified mediocrity with indifference. One would expect Hobbes to have preferred the passionless, inoffensive, little man who is likely to obey all laws. He did not, and that is telling.

Telling too, however, is the fact that Hobbes did not seek to found his new politics on the passionate man he seemed to admire. And this is not simply because there were too few of them. Even a society entirely consisting of these aristocratic passions would not serve Hobbes’s purpose. The problem is the variability of their object as well as the intensity of the passions. Recall from above, the aristocratic passions he identified are all involved in the quest for power, power in its various forms. Individuals with strong passions therefore feel more strongly that “perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death.” This is why Hobbes only seems to be caught in a bind in Leviathan where he attributes to vainglorious men both ostentatious inaction and “rash engaging.” He is not caught in a bind because vainglory can lead to both. This has nothing to do with his rhetorical exaggeration that vainglory is a form of madness. Rather, in human society power can be achieved through bluffing, which he describes as ostentation without attempt. At other times rashness will pay off. As in all things in Hobbes’s world, this is a calculation the individual must make. The timorous man will venture very little, the passionate man quite a bit more, perhaps more than he ought. The problem for Hobbes is that so long as men must make this calculation it will be made entirely on the basis of the idiosyncratic intensity of their passions. There is no way to predict or guarantee what men will do. This is why he must rely upon fear.

**HOBBE’S ARISTOCRATIC SOUL**

There is a place for the aristocratic soul in Hobbes’s philosophical work. It is, of course, a very different place from the classical conception because his is an aristocracy of passion rather than virtue. The passionate man is neither a cool, collected Stoic nor an Epicurean with four aces. Yet neither is he an erotic soul on the model of Plato’s philosopher. The man of great passion that Hobbes found so much more interesting than the “indifferent” man was interesting precisely because he had more “wit.” These were the ones with a greater desire for power, riches, knowledge, and honor. But in the new aris-
tocracy the objects of their passion are no longer, or should no longer be, political. As Leo Strauss observed, “At the end of this process there is, however, not only the establishment of a peculiarly bourgeois morality, but at the same time aristocratic virtue itself becomes sublimated and spiritualized.”

A good example of the new type of aristocrat may be Hobbes’s one-time employer, Francis Bacon. According to Hobbes, Bacon died as a result of a rash experiment in food preservation. The story is preserved by John Aubrey as follows:

Mr. Hobbs told me that the cause of his lordship’s death was trying an experiment: viz., as he was taking the aire in a coach with Dr. Witherborne (a Scotchman, Physitian to the King) towards High-gate, snow lay on the ground, and it came into my lord’s thoughts, why flesh might not be preserved in snow, as in salt. They were resolved they would try the experiment presently. They alighted out of the coach, and went into a poore woman’s howse at the bottome of Highgate hill, and bought a hen, and made the woman exenterate it, and then stuffed the bodie with snow, and my lord did help to doe it himselfe. The snow so chilled him, that he immediately fell so extremely ill, that he could not returne to his lodgings (I suppose then at Graye’s Inne), but went to the earle of Arundell’s house at High-gate, where they put him into a good bed warmed with a panne, but it was a damp bed that had not been layn-in in about a yeare before, which gave him such a cold that in 2 or 3 dayes; as I remember he told me, he dyed of suffocation.

Scholars have suggested a number of problems with this story. For one, this carriage ride was supposed to have taken place in April, when there is little snow. Additionally, he seems to have been ill months earlier. Jardine and Stewart also suggest that Bacon was experimenting on ways to preserve his own life, not poultry, when he died. His correspondence lends some credence to this conclusion, which makes Hobbes’s revision even more interesting. Whatever may be the exact details of Bacon’s death, we should be more concerned that Hobbes wanted this story recorded by Aubrey. What does it tell us? It tells us of a man so driven to experiment that he lost his life. As such, it may be the first romantic account of the scientist in modern literature.

In Hobbes’s account of Bacon’s death the romance of science is more broadly a romance of passion. The passionate artist of word, sound, or paint has become a commonplace. For example, George Orwell listed “sheer egotism” as the first of his four reasons in “Why I Write.” In that same essay he described a writer as “a person whose most absorbed and passionate hours are spent arranging words on pieces of paper.” Beethoven may provide an even more compelling example. Consider the following from his diaries, “Live alone in your art! Restricted though you be by your defective sense, this is still the only existence for you.” Earlier, his passion for music was
all that kept him alive, “Such experiences brought me to the verge of des­
pair—but little more and I should have put an end to my life. Art, art alone
deterring me.”51 The image of the deaf Beethoven agonizing over composing
music he could never hear is better explained by Hobbes than by Aristotle.
Our cultural life is immeasurably richer because of these aristocrats of pas­sion.
The irony is that our politics may be much worse, a fate Hobbes would
have deplored.

We live in a world characterized by passion. Passionate leaders are
sought, pursuing one’s passion is considered the height of human fulfillment,
and political education has become a matter of affect and emotion rather than
duty or right. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, “. . . for equality they
have an ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible passion; they want equality in
freedom, and, if they cannot get it, they still want it in slavery.”52 Hobbes’s
conception has triumphed and we are in many ways the beneficiaries of
aristocrats of passion, especially in the sciences and the arts, that is, outside
of politics. Unfortunately, the passionatecampaigner for one cause or an­
other has become a cliché because passion has become a substitute for virtue.
And while some campaigns are far better than others, passion is measured
more in its intensity than in its object. As a result, the most passionate
politics from the French to the Cultural Revolution have not produced the
peaceful societies Hobbes sought. We must remember, of course, that he did
not want the politics of aristocratic passion. He wanted the politics of fear.
But his work contained within it a view of nobility, an understanding of the
aristocratic soul that would unleash wars beyond his imagining.

NOTES

1. For a list of commentators from the first half of the twentieth century who hold his
position, see Keith Thomas, “Social Origins of Hobbes’ Political Thought,” in Hobbes Studies,
list would include Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory
(London: Macmillan, 2000); Julie E. Cooper, “Vain Glory, Modesty, and Political Agency in the
“‘Lord over the Children of Pride’: The Vain-Glorious Rhetoric of Hobbes’s Leviathan,”

Network, 1995).

Harvard University Press, 2013), 43.


70–71.


10. So concerned with pride was Hobbes that in both De Cive and Leviathan (but not The Elements of Law) he set aside a specific law of nature against it (number 8 in De Cive, number 9 in Leviathan). While I cannot expand upon this here, it is worthwhile to note that the law of nature against pride does not address vain glory. The passion of vain glory is, for Hobbes, addressed in the law of nature against revenge, which does appear in all three accounts.


13. Hobbes would no doubt object, but it is difficult to ignore the similarity with the words of John Ball, the radical priest of the Peasants’ Revolt: “When Adam delved and Eve span, Who was then a gentleman?” See Cooper, “Vain glory, Modesty, and Political Agency,” 249.


15. Consider, for instance, Aristotle’s account of the development of democracy in Athens: “For because the people were the cause of [Athenian] naval supremacy during the Persian wars, they began to have high thoughts and to obtain mean persons as popular leaders when they were opposed politically by the respectable.” See Aristotle, Politics, 84 (1274a10–15).


20. For the story of Hobbes’s attempt to square the circle and John Wallis’ spirited rebuttal, see Douglas M. Jessop, Squaring the Circle: The War between Hobbes and Wallis (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999).


33. See, for instance, Hobbes, Leviathan, 90, 97–99, 117, 138, and 206. The same point is made in De Cive, with the addition that fear is a sufficient reason to break a contract in the state of nature. See On the Citizen, 37 (II.xi).


44. Hobbes, Leviathan, 70.
46. See Hobbes, Leviathan, 54; Elements of Law, 51.
51. Heiligenstadt Testament, Oct. 6, 1802, XXX.

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