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2010

Review of *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books Alpha - Delta* by Edward C. Halper

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Recommended Citation

Maher, Daniel P. "Review of *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books Alpha - Delta* by Edward C. Halper." *The Review of Metaphysics* vol. 63 no. 3 (March 2010), pp. 699-701. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25681151>.

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itself a guarantee of scientific knowledge of the world. It is easy to find contemporary philosophers who would concur.

It should be noted that Niccolo Guicciardini is Professor of the History of Science at the University of Bergamo, Italy. He is the author of *The Development of Newtonian Calculus in Britain, 1700-1800* and *Reading the Principia: The Debate on Newton's Mathematical Methods for Natural Philosophy from 1687 to 1736*. This work only adds to his formidable stature as a scholar of the Newtonian period.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

HALPER, Edward C. *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books Alpha-Delta*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2009. xli + 524 pp. Cloth, \$48.00—The heart of this book (and fully one-third of its bulk) advances a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* book Gamma. Halper treats the other books more selectively, focusing on the theme of the one and the many. In conjunction with his *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books* (1989, 2005) and a third volume treating books Iota through Nu (forthcoming), this volume brings forward a new synthesis of Aristotle's thought in studied opposition to dominant contemporary tendencies toward emphasis on linguistic concerns, fragmentation of Aristotle's text, and "deflationary" interpretations. On Halper's reading, the first five books argue for the existence of metaphysics as a unified—though peculiar—Aristotelian science; the central books articulate the primacy of categorial *ousia* and of form; the five remaining books identify primary *ousiai* and the highest causes. Halper's Aristotle unfolds his doctrine through progressive stages in a text that is "carefully, accurately, and—dare I say it—beautifully laid out."

Halper argues that the problem of the one and the many is "inherently bound up with the existence and nature of metaphysics" and that Aristotle uses it to structure the argument for his own metaphysical doctrine, which resolves the problem and allows it to fade from view. Books Alpha and Little Alpha establish *that* metaphysics exists; showing *how* metaphysics can be one science requires solving the *aporiai* in Beta, which are one/many problems. The source of all or nearly all the *aporiai* is the assumption that a cause (or form or principle) is one. This assumption—the focal point of the commentary on the first two books—is not only common to Aristotle and his predecessors, but also "intrinsically tied to metaphysics." He aims to show that Aristotle's distinctive doctrines (such as that being is *pros hen* equivocal) are supported to the extent that they uniquely resolve the *aporiai*. Halper reads Gamma's

arguments as inverted such that the apparent conclusions (for example, the principle of non-contradiction is true) are actually premises in arguments supporting Aristotle's doctrines (such as that each being has an essence). He regards Delta as integral to Aristotle's argument, but he treats in detail only the chapters on being and one, which he uses to combat the contemporary assumptions that the one/many problematic is merely a Platonic concern and that one and being are "virtually equivalent."

This book deserves to become a kind of reference point interpretation for contemporary scholarship precisely because it is a comprehensive reading that reasserts the integrity of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Halper attends meticulously but not tediously to Aristotle's text, and he defends a plausible reading that remains philosophically rich while preserving Aristotle from confusion and contradiction. Indeed, Halper's lone substantive criticism is that Aristotle has not adequately shown that *only* his doctrines solve the *aporiai*. Halper displays a familiar ease with the style of Aristotelian thinking and elliptical argumentation. Perhaps no book is uniformly persuasive, but the careful attention Halper gives to Aristotle merits scholarly engagement. He is generous with clear expressions of his plan and with frequent summaries of sections of argument.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to some features or tensions that deserve further examination. First, Halper presents his approach to Aristotle's text (based on the one and the many problematic) both as one "interpretive structure" imposed on a "radically underdetermined" text that admits "multiple reconstructions" and as Aristotle's own problematic for organizing his text, which is intrinsic to any metaphysics. Second, Halper traces the *aporiai* not to *competing* assumptions, but to one primary assumption—a cause is one—that admits multiple interpretations. He could have strengthened his treatment of this thesis by juxtaposing it with Aristotle's account of chance as a non unified quasi cause. Additionally, if Halper is correct that Aristotle crafts the *aporiai* to lead us to discover and modify this uncritically accepted assumption, this strategy seems notably defective since it is and has been consistently overlooked. Third, Halper resists reading the refined doctrines of the central books into the opening books. Thus, he takes pains to regard locutions like "being *qua* being" and "*ousia*" as initially mere "placeholders" whose senses and referents are determined only subsequently. As attractive as this approach is, Halper does not adhere to it unqualifiedly. He repeatedly invokes his own distinctive interpretation of Iota to make sense of Gamma, even as he denies Gamma presupposes the doctrine of Iota. Moreover, because he prepares us to examine Alpha through his interpretation of Delta (which also draws on Iota), we see Aristotle's text from the beginning through a sophisticated metaphysical lens borrowed from subsequent stages of inquiry. Fourth, Halper attacks the widespread

assumption of the “virtual identity” of one and being “that would, unchecked, undermine the rest of my analysis.” He claims instead that one is subordinate to being, but he does not express with his usual clarity how this is to be understood and how various senses of one and being are dependent on various senses of nature, essence, or *ousia*. Indeed, Halper claims, “It is not inconsistent to say that they are virtually the same and also to say that one is subordinate to being.”—Daniel P. Maher, *Assumption College*.

HOY, David Couzens. *The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2009. xxi + 288 pp. Cloth \$34.00—With this study of “the history of time-consciousness,” David Hoy presents us with the first of a projected two volume set on “the history of self-consciousness.” This is shorthand for a study of post-Kantian accounts of time-consciousness and self-consciousness in the Continental tradition. By “critical” in the subtitle Hoy means to align himself not with Kant nor with the Frankfurt School but with Foucault and his genealogical approach. Hoy tells us in his introduction that the genealogical approach challenges “predominant understandings of what the philosophical issues are supposed to be by shaking the foundations of philosophy and showing that philosophical concepts and issues are not fixed in stone forever.” In a concluding chapter, the book provides a helpful “Postscript on Method,” in which Hoy discusses his approach in the context of a concise survey of contemporary continental philosophy. Hoy orients his discussion of contemporary continental philosophy around Bernard Williams’s distinction between “vindicatory” and “unmasking” philosophy. Hoy sees phenomenology as descriptive and “vindicatory,” while genealogy is “unmasking.” He acknowledges that there is a descriptive moment within genealogy but that unmasking is primary. Nietzsche is genealogy’s predecessor and Foucault is its primary proponent according to Hoy, but Derrida and other poststructuralists are also to be considered genealogical. Unlike the Frankfurt School, genealogy is not teleological though it may be messianic, and it challenges the Frankfurt School notion of ‘ideology’—which notion requires a stance beyond ideology. Genealogy, for Hoy, always has a standpoint; it is perspectivist. In conclusion, Hoy acknowledges that his study is vindicatory—as history it describes the philosophical terrain with regards to time and temporality. Yet it vindicates the genealogical and unmasking approach to his theme.

In addition to the postscript the book has a preface, acknowledgements, introduction and five chapters. The five chapters