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Edmund Husserl: Transcending Ideology

Molly Brigid McGrath
Assumption College

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Husserl was a German mathematician-turned-philosopher, born in Moravia—now part of the Czech Republic, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—into a Jewish household. His breakthrough work, *The Logical Investigations* of 1900–1901, started the phenomenological movement, which tremendously influenced European thought in the twentieth century and which continues today in Europe, America, and beyond.

After reading the New Testament, Husserl converted as a young man to a rather non-doctrinal Christianity. He was a patriotic German and lost a son in World War I. He was known for living a stoical, respectable, and even bourgeois life at home and in universities: writing, lecturing, and talking. In 1933, his son Gerhard, a philosopher of law, lost his job at the same time that the emeritus Husserl was denied privileges at his university, because of their Jewish ethnicity. His most famous student and his successor in the chair at the University of Freiburg became Rector there and was just one of many National Socialists called upon to enforce such ordinances. In 1938 Husserl died naturally before he might have died violently—as Edith Stein, another of his students, did at Auschwitz in 1942. In 1939, his wife and his incredible mass of papers were smuggled safely to Belgium.

After the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl published several more, and indeed better, books and essays and lectures, treating philosophically, e.g., logic, perception, our experience of other people, knowledge, time, human rational and spiritual life, and the “lifeworld” of straightforward human experience. He was a committed critic of the irrationalism of radical subjectivistic skepticisms, historicism, psychologism, and any theory that attempts to convince human persons that they are incapable of reason and knowledge. For Husserl, the human mind finds its fulfillment in truth, insight, evidence; that is, authentic thought is knowledge of true being. Still, Husserl avoids a naïve rationalism, identifying this fulfillment as an infinite task, with relative and temporary victories. While a defender of the human ability to know and of philosophy as a science, he also saw clearly that absolute knowledge is only approached by humans and that philosophy is always re-beginning.

He wrote much more than he published. His posthumously published works, lectures, letters, and personal research manuscripts show that he had a philosophical breadth and a keenness for detail and deep problems that belong to but a handful of philosophers in history. There is practically no philosophical theme—from essences to cultural ontology to ethics—that he did not write about rather intensely. Except, perhaps, for political life.

He was not a political philosopher. He was an apolitical philosopher. Still, I think, Husserl’s apolitical philosophy has some deep, if indirect, political implications.

The marching banner for phenomenologists has been “To the things themselves!” and phenomenologists feel most at home describing objects as they show up to us. Husserl’s
philosophy attempts to recover the objectivity of reality without succumbing to a crude objectivism. It recognizes that the objects we experience have essences that structure how we can experience them, and it is as interested in the subjective life in which we experience things as it is in the things experienced. Phenomenology resists the objectification of persons, rational subjects who experience and know the world, into mere things; at the same time, it resists the anti-realism that would deny either the objectivity of worldly things or the special and distinct type of “transcendental” being that each human person has.

This unjustly cursory summary of the man’s life and conclusions must suffice as an introduction to this chapter and an invitation to the reader for a closer look. This essay offers an Husserlian account of ideology and suggests, with some appeal to “the things themselves” (the facts of his life), how Husserl the teacher succeeded and perhaps failed in an time of ideological illusions and tragedies.

Husserl’s Apolitical Philosophy

_Transcendental philosophy, a very useless art, does not aid the lords and masters of this world, the politicians, engineers, industrialists._\(^1\)

Husserl wrote to his son Gerhard (July 5, 1935) that his philosophy is “wholly unpolitical.”\(^2\) Except for a few scattered remarks, he is at his most political when he speaks between the World Wars about the cultural “crisis” and growing irrationalism of European life. The crisis, that is, was in his lights not primarily political. The obvious, terrifying, and tragic political events of this period of European history seem to have appeared to him as symptoms of a deeper disease of spirit and values: a disorder in our beliefs about reason, personhood, and truth. Namely, he believed that human beings as rational animals live under absolute norms of truth. To be genuinely human persons, to live up to our personhood, we must seek to live up to truth, where truth is not just theoretical but also evaluative and practical—it is a matter of how and what we think, but also of how and what we feel, value, and do. The crisis of values he identified and fought against in his later years arose, he thought, from a terrible rejection of reason. A narrow rationalism, identified usually with Enlightenment thought, is one form of this: “The European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism.”\(^3\) This rationalism had symptoms (e.g., naturalism, consumerism, a rebirth of egoistic nationalism, Nazism) in other cultural and political phenomena, which should be seen, at least partly, as misguided responses to or fallouts of this rejection of reason’s central role in human life.

He thought that, to address this deeper crisis, what European life needed most was a rediscovery of reason in its properly broad and rich sense. And this was the task especially of philosophy and the philosophy of the other sciences. Husserl therefore emphasized (in a way many of his readers find embarrassing) the beginnings of philosophy in ancient Greece; the _telos_ of European culture as the development of this love of truth with its concern for self-critique and evidence; the need for Europe to rededicate itself to this idea; and our vocation to share it with the rest of humanity. He feared that our response to the failure of modern rationalism would be a “fall into hostility toward spirit and into barbarity,” but he hoped that
we might instead overcome what a narrow rationalism has led us into, namely, a reductive, naïve objectivism, with its cynical dismissal of ethical and rational norms: the choice was between “the downfall of Europe in its estrangement from its own rational sense of life” and “the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy.”

In speaking of this crisis, Husserl urged a return to the Greek spirit, especially in its rejection of sophistry. He paints Socrates as defending the ethical life against the sophists who had, “through their subjectivism, confused and corrupted general moral convictions.” Socrates did not just defend the presophistic status quo, of course, but responded to sophistry by trying to raise humanity to a new level, insisting on the need for human beings to live out a radical, self-critiquing search for justification and insight in ethical life. Husserl paints Plato as further defending this radical Socratic dedication to ethical truth and self-responsibility by responding to the sophistic “anti-scientific skepticism”; namely, Plato did this by developing philosophy as a science, as theoretical knowledge, and by developing an understanding of how “the communal life” or “man writ large” defends “the rational individual life.” In these ways, philosophy becomes in some sense the foundation for a reasonable and genuinely human life, individually and communally.

When concluding the 1910 “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” after refuting the skeptical pseudoscientific reductions of reason by naturalism, psychologism, and historicism, Husserl turns to discuss worldviews and philosophy. He rejects what we might call worldviewism, the claim linked especially to historicism that one’s reason is determined by one’s or the epoch’s view of the world. But he does not deny that worldview is something influential over the way we think, and even a positive something, since in its best sense it is wise. He then discusses worldview philosophy, which is the attempt by thinkers to give a worldview grand theoretical clarity and depth. We need wisdom in the world, good practical judgment shaped by experience and informed by a sense of the puzzles of human life and the cosmos. The attempts to deepen and make consistent such thought are worthwhile.

Here Husserl recognizes a service played by such thought, he just denies that it is philosophy in the proper, scientific sense. He implies that, though such thought may be more urgent, it is “from certain points of view” less important than true philosophy. To try to turn worldview reflection into philosophy in his radical and proper sense is to give in to our age’s “fanaticism” about science, and would manage only to sacrifice real philosophizing for a proliferation of worldview-filled wise men. Here belongs Husserl’s comment to his student Aron Gurwitsch: “There are philosophers aplenty. Someone must do the dirty work—that is me and you.” Worldview philosophy must take positions without radical ground, whereas philosophy must work slowly, from the ground up, seeking truth with justification and understanding. “For the sake of time, we must not sacrifice eternity.” Even those thinkers who have given history its highest worldviews, he comments, did so because they were aiming for philosophy as knowledge.

In 1919, an admiring and critical young thinker, Arnold Metzger, who later became his personal assistant, wrote to Husserl and included several writings, including Phänomenologie der Revolution, which was a “critique of philosophies which become ideologies defending a bankrupt social order” and a “quest for genuine ideals of humanity which can serve as a basis.
for social rebirth.” Husserl responded in a long letter urging the young man to study with him. He encouraged Metzger while deeply and sharply disagreeing with him: “I cannot help doubting and even definitely rejecting much of what you say.” Husserl praised Metzger’s idealism and “ethical maximalism,” his desire to renew mankind by reminding it of true ideals, and his “critical examination” of Marxism, naturalism, positivism, and any other attempt to rob human life of worthy ideals, but Husserl also marks some deep disagreements.

In addition to trying to correct Metzger’s interpretation of his transcendental turn, Husserl insisted on a kind of practical difference between them. Husserl was clearly moved by the young man’s dedication to ideals and to the imperative of improving culture and politics. In fact, in the letter Husserl identifies the point of his whole life and philosophy as, in a sense, serving this improvement of humanity, and he denies that scientific truth is the fulfillment of human life. Still, Husserl backs off of politics and of any direct political use of philosophy. He says, contrasting Metzger to himself, “you are a man of action by vocation and preference.” Though driven by the same radical ethical and philosophical concerns as Husserl, Metzger’s theoretically informed political striving needs more, and better, philosophy first: “then comes the demanding task already attributed to you, the study of human realities and their philosophical guidance.”

This is not my task; I am not called to lead humanity in striving for happy life. I had to acknowledge this in the sorrowful course of my war years: my daimonion warned me. I live consciously and by choice purely as a scientific philosopher (I have written no books concerning the war, since I regarded that as a pretentious philosophical ostentation). Not that I consider truth and science the highest values. Quite the contrary, “Intellect is the servant of the will,” and so also I am the servant of those who shape our practical life, of the leaders of humanity. —Naturally, you will not want to accept this apportioning of functions as valid. You are young, and full of the overflowing consciousness of your strength; you still believe that you can and must attempt both functions. But as long as God preserves you in the Socratic dedication and in the radicalism of truthful life, your daimonion will speak to you at the right time.

Husserl then adds a warning, because genuine philosophy is harder than it seems.

The will is subject to the norms of truth, namely, the true good, and seeking truth in its fullness is an ethical task, but Husserl suggests here that scientific truth is not sufficient for good practical decisions, and that the scientific life should not be confused with the active life of political leadership.

In his 1923-24 articles for the Japanese journal Kaizo, Husserl expresses the need for a reorientation of culture and values. He makes two points in the first of these articles, “Renewal: Its Problem and Method,” key to understanding his approach to philosophy, politics, and ideology.

First, he distinguishes between the type of rationalization of the universe done by the natural sciences, which explain by appealing to causes, and the rationalization to be done with the help of the spiritual sciences, which can explain by pointing toward norms according to which humans as free and rational animals should motivate themselves. Because human thought is subject to norms, and not merely the play thing of (psychological, economic, political, historical, etc.) forces, the human sciences must not ape the natural sciences in methods or aims. Real cultural renewal, a movement toward a more genuinely human life, requires scientific philosophy of the human person, community, and reason.
Scientific philosophy must help us understand the essential structures of human life and the world, but it must also articulate the normative ideals of reason, and in this way lead humanity toward a higher life. Though sometimes Husserl is too naïve in his statement of this kingly role of philosophers, we should perhaps understand his vision as something like this: natural scientists seem to be in our time admired as the paradigm of reason and as the articulators of the ideals of the rational life, and Husserl believes this role should be filled by those who are dedicated to reason in its radicalness, breadth, and normative power—philosophers. As he says later, the “prosperity” of positive sciences has blinded us and has “meant an indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity. Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.” Husserl’s is simultaneously a call to culture at large to reorient itself toward a fuller sense of reason and also a call to philosophers to do so, and thereby to serve culture, not by doing something other than philosophy, but precisely by being better philosophers.

Though the first point from the “Renewal” essay worth emphasis here is that scientific philosophy is needed in order to move toward a truly human, reasonable life, individually and communally, the second is that scientific philosophy is limited in its ability to help us live in practical reason. Though at other times he seems to overstate the effectiveness of a philosophical renewal for a cultural renewal, here Husserl clearly indicates that a proper philosophy is needed, but not enough. Whereas “the merely empirical sciences of man…cannot offer us what we need in our striving for renewal,” the proper “helper” of this renewal is an actual understanding of what human spirituality—in its individual, social, political, and cultural dimensions—essentially is, can be, and should seek to be. A scientific philosophy of human life provides “preparatory theoretical work” for the reasonable renewal of culture. And again, reflecting on the failure of philosophy so far to provide an understanding of the essential structures and norms of human life, Husserl asks,

>What should we do? Should we again proceed, as in political matters when, for instance, as citizens we prepare to vote? Are we supposed to judge only according to instinct and inclination, according to assumption we tend to overlook? Actions like these may be perfectly justified if the day comes on which such a decision is required, and with it the action is completed. But in our case there is a concern for a temporal infinity and for the eternal in the temporal—the future of mankind, the genesis of a true humanity—for which we still feel ourselves responsible.

The task of the philosopher is in certain respects more important but less urgent in addressing the cultural crisis. It is more kingly, but less forceful. It reaches in more deeply but cuts less directly than politics. It invests for centuries, but does not solve the pressing practical problems of today and tomorrow.

Some have accused Husserl of presenting an ultimately anarchist political philosophy, because when he describes the ideal human community—the “genuine humanity” for which his philosophy feels responsible—it is not a political community. The question remains how various types of political community could help or hinder the development toward such a perfect “community of love,” an ideal and infinitely distant, multi- and super-national human life. Still, this ideal is in itself not political. That is just to say, for Husserl, human being would find its highest earthly culmination in a truly ethical, reasonable, and love-infused personal and communally shared life; government is not the point or the fulfillment, but a servant of this life,
and how it can serve this life seems to be mostly a matter of prudence. This prudence can and should be informed by scientific philosophy’s elucidation of the essential structures of human life and community, and should be inspired by the norms of reason and ethics that philosophy can help articulate. Still, he implies, philosophy seems neither called nor able to supplant this prudence, the wisdom needed to serve human fulfillment politically in the human space that must remain under of this ideal.

Husserl did not confront political ideologies directly. This came partly from a decision to protect what was most important in his work. This seems to me a wise tactical move. Philosophies are too often either expropriated or attacked by political movements. The best political thought to come out of his students has partly arisen from the conviction that there is a reality to human beings deeper than politics and a calling of human beings far beyond politics. Zdzisław Krasnodębski comments, for example, that it was the very apolitical nature of phenomenology that attracted philosophers behind the Iron Curtain to it, since in a totalitarian situation being unpolitical is a most powerful and subversive political statement. Naturally—but ironically, from the point of view of politics—this conviction seems necessary for a decent politics. Politics has nothing to serve apart from itself unless we preserve and honor nonpolitical human goods. In philosophy it is a mistake and in practical politics it is a mishandling of our situation to make too much of politics.

The “apportioning of functions” Husserl wrote about to Metzger seems to follow from an important insight, an insight that gives political reason an incomplete but real independence from the philosophical task of securing scientific knowledge about essential structures of human life, valid but far off ideals, and universal a priori truths. It is an insight that respects non-philosophical knowledge and authority. It therefore protects the world of human living from experts with a “scientific” theory, aping the natural sciences, about how the human world “really” works.

Husserl’s most important insight in political philosophy seems to be a distinction between politics and philosophy. This seems to me a crucial point. It is not an error from within chemistry to think that chemistry can solve all human problems. It is not the effect of a psychological defect that some psychologists think that human beliefs are all explained psychologically. These are philosophical errors. It is a political mistake, in addition to a philosophical error, terrible and too common, to elevate politics to the point of life or political thought to the highest human knowledge, to think that politics can solve all human problems or that our beliefs are all determined politically. It does not complete a political philosophy, but it is a good start, to distinguish between politics and philosophy. Likewise, it is a philosophical mistake to presume philosophy replaces rather than elucidates, elevates, and protects non-philosophical life. Though we should wish that this great thinker reflected more on the structures of political life, we should be grateful for what he has left us and thankful that he at least did not make these mistakes.

**Ideologism**

And what of the rationality of that irrationalism which is so much vaunted and expected of us? Does it not have
In “Science as a Vocation,” Max Weber argues that values should be left out of a teacher’s lessons. The student turns to the teacher not as a partisan prophet, a worldview preacher, or a lifecoach, but to teach what is known about some subject. It is wrong to transform the lectern into a pulpit or platform.

Science is a matter of facts, known truths, whereas values for Weber are not a matter of reason—or of unreason. They are not knowable, but result from personal decision, from one’s ultimate position to life. To disagree with Weber, one must disagree somehow with the way he characterizes facts and values. It is a naïve distinction, and the cynical rejection of it claims that the facts are as much up for grabs and in need of a personal decision as values. If we think following Weber, but reject his distinction in this cynical way, then what he fears most comes to pass more than ever. Facts would be putty in the hands of a worldview, and teachers would not be able to be anything other than prophets or activists.

In short, the particular danger to teaching and learning that I wish to discuss with Husserl’s help is ideologism. This is its danger: it transforms teaching and learning from a truth-approaching activity to a prejudice-, preference-, and worldview-infecting process. Ideologism is the claim that all people have an ideology: all people are adherents of some system of fundamental beliefs that (1) determines their other beliefs, in the sense that it (2) is the interpretive framework by which they understand any thing or state of affairs, and thus that (3) is not susceptible of evidence (because it is the interpretive framework for all possible evidence).

Grand ideologies are no longer stylish, but ideologism is quite popular. Its presence in a student’s mind blocks true learning, and because it gives a prose-cutorial immunity to any person’s ideology of choice, it invites a teacher to become an agitator.

In order to recover teaching and learning as truth-relevant activities, we must destroy this ism of isms. Husserl’s “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” is directed at various doctrines (naturalism, psychologism, historicism, worldviewism) that reject the person’s ability to get to truth, so we start there.

Husserl attacks intellectual ideologies, always in defense of the ability of mind to transcend itself. Psychologism claims that beliefs are caught in a system of causally determining psychological laws. Naturalism claims that all things—including beliefs and values—are nature in the sense asserted by modern natural science, quantified matter governed by exact laws. Historicism claims that beliefs are produced by historical milieu. This pattern appears in many varieties. Also common is the sociologistic version, claiming that beliefs are determined by social or socioeconomic status. There is also a sexist version, a genderist version, a racist version, a psychoanalytic version, and so on. The common factor is the assignment of causes where reasons are supposed to be capable of operating. For some reason, since Husserl’s time until now, these anti-intellectual ideologies have been très chic among intellectuals.

Husserl’s disproof of such skeptical claims is to show that they are self-defeating, “counter-sense.” In each case, the belief asserting the causal claim that all beliefs are caused
by such and such should also be caused by such and such, in which case the assertion must lack reasons. Husserl likes to remind us here of basic logic rules. Such truths would not afford our insight (and we could not think at all) if all beliefs were determined as dominoes in some pattern of events. A “radical subjective skepticism” about logic is absurd because it denies to logical principles their role as ideals presiding over thought, and even (often enough, especially) the people attempting to deny them appeal to ideals of reason, and must.

In urging others to render tribute to whatever reduction you fancy, you must pay them in reasons, but any appeal you make to principles for consistent thinking robs your conclusion of its currency and meaning. To argue for the despotism of force over thought, one must pay homage to the sovereignty of reason and the liberty of the mind.

Any reason-giving for these claims begs the question against such claims that mind is not open to reasons. The man who asserts, in communication, such a proposition is performing the intellectual version of mutually assured destruction, though he doesn’t know it.

But equally, any reason-giving against these claims begs the question. The best we can do to disprove such a claim is point out to ourselves and to anyone else around that this man’s position (proposition) destroys his own position (ground) as truth-claimer and reason-giver. We then want to appreciate—and I mean, not just notice, but also wonder at and be thankful for—the fact that mind is open to evidence.

These isms have a common factor—the claim that ideas are not ideas but something else. Husserl’s accusation of self-refutation against them is decisive, but a negative and not a positive victory. His entire philosophical career, the key moves he makes in establishing the phenomenological movement, is the positive response, because it elucidates the openness of the mind to the world and thereby helps us see the absurdity in denying that the mind is the mind, and not something else.

Husserl makes several basic moves that help us reopen the space of reason in an age of cynical skepticism:

(a) By its nature, the mind is essentially open and receptive to other things. This is his celebrated doctrine of intentionality, a small thing with deep implications. We are not aware merely of our own creations, our images or concepts. We are aware of things other than ourselves.

(b) He urges us to return to the things themselves for their truths. Against systems of a priori hypothesizing, against “top down” thinking that imagines it can tell us how things must be in abstraction from our encounters with them, Husserl insists that thought finds its telos and becomes authentic in the insightful presence of the objects about which we think.

(c) He reasserts the rights of the world of human experience. Because, even pre-philosophically, mind encounters things, he defends the everyday reason operative in pretheoretical life. The mind’s encounter with the world is not invented by philosophy. Intentionality, mind’s openness to and interest in the things themselves, didn’t go comatose in the modern era, even though many philosophers stopped believing in it. This is the major reason moderns discount the commonly assumed world and the reason operative in it. In contrast, Husserl insists that, while episteme [science] is higher than doxa [opinion], the higher levels build on and cannot replace the lower level.
Teaching is supposed to be a guiding of students to learn, and learning means gaining and deepening one’s understanding of the world, oneself, and beyond. What are the conditions of the possibility of authentic teaching? That there is a truth about things and that we can encounter things in their truth. That the realm of things themselves shows up to us, teachers and students, in common, so that we can talk about it. That the student doesn’t start from nowhere, but starts with prior, valid though less perfect, contact with the truth of things.

Husserl is a teacher who leads us to see that these theses are not ungrounded, merely hopeful hypotheses. They follow from the nature of our situation—that we find ourselves together, minded, and in the world.

An Husserlian Contribution to Political Philosophy: Naturalism and other Ideologies

“We must also allow relative evidences. Otherwise we dissolve life.”

Husserl also teaches us how to understand those systems of assertions that would deny our situation. One of his most important, and original, analyses is of the naturalistic attitude. I shall argue that this analysis should be extended by analogy to help us understand ideology generally. About naturalism, he makes two main claims:

(1) Everyday prephilosophical intentionality (Husserl’s “natural” attitude or “personalistic” attitude) does its job too well, though of course fallibly: it sees the world, but it is invisible to itself, it lacks self-knowledge. The naturalistic attitude attempts to abstract from all subject-relative characteristics of the world—for example, values, culture, prejudices, sensations. In an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of common human subjectivity, it digs in deeper on self-forgetfulness. It is hyperaware of how the activities of consciousness skew others’ beliefs, but it is more thoroughly unaware of its own fallibility because it pretends to have escaped subjectivity. The naturalistic attitude may acquire an expansionist disdain for everyday experience and dismiss its accomplishments. When it does so, it claims to uncover the “true” world beneath the world of experience, and to dismiss as false subjective construction the world as experienced and understood by common human sensibility, thought, and culture.

(2) The naturalistic attitude operates on the assumption that physical things are ideally mathematical and perfectly determined by laws we can formalize mathematically. We never in fact come across ideally flat planes, perfect spheres, or falling objects immune to incidental friction. In fact we know that concrete things cannot fulfill these geometrical ideals. But Galileo’s theories about freefalling objects speak as though the boards and balls of his experiment instantiate this ideal realm and obey perfectly laws formulated in its terms.

In sum, the naturalistic attitude involves us in two abstractions: it abstracts away the human involvement in the world and abstracts away the non-ideal concreteness and irregularities of things. Theorists adopting the naturalistic attitude commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, and undermine their own ground, if they assert that this method captures wholly the one true world and provides an etiology of the merely subjective
experiences of prescientific life.

When these abstractions are applied to ideas and the life of reason, theorizing persons taking up the naturalistic attitude cut off their legs—or, more aptly, close up their eyes and ears and minds: since the naturalistic attitude abstracts from human meaning and subjective experience, it cannot make sense of these as what they are. It is by making this reifying, self-referential move of trying to causally explain acts of reason, which must after all include scientific theorizing, that natural science warps itself into a self-refuting naturalistic dogmatism. It is the reification of mind and its ideas and laws that results in the ideological character of naturalism and of other ideologies.

Naturalism is the ideological evil twin of natural science, and is only one example. Ideology is usually about more properly human things: about politics, culture, religion, morality, etc. But other ideologies approach these phenomena with analogous dual abstractions. (1) Ideology dismisses pre-theoretical ideas about how the human world works. It tries to explain the human things of ethics and politics in formulas, imagining that it has discovered a telescope that sees around, and no longer through, normal human eyes. (2) Ideology speaks as though people fulfilled a theoretical ideal. Not only are we pushed into being merely instances of an ideal type governed by simplified laws, so that our irregularities are smoothed away to fit into the theory, but also usually ideologies abstract away some particular necessary feature of human nature (for example, that we must know and care about certain people more than others, or that not all goods can be measured monetarily, or that persons bear responsibility for their actions and products despite the social structures they find themselves within).

I suggest these are the essential features of ideology. That ideologues are closed to counter-evidence is the first property flowing from this essence. Someone in the grip of an ideology cannot appreciate and weigh evidence contrary to their overall theory because they start by rejecting the validity of normal evidence and believe their fundamental theory about what is “really” going on morally or politically explains the origin of the appearances, the false consciousness, of those who do not accept their system.

This is analogous to the way a conspiracy theory works. A conspiracy theory involves two allegations: the primary crime and the cover-up. A conspiracy theory becomes a closed system, not open to public reason and disproof, when any evidence that does not support the primary accusation is taken to support the cover-up allegation. This creates an unchallengeable interpretive framework. Ideologies can work as complete explanations and closed interpretative frameworks only because they discount the evidence offered in common to human beings. In order to permanently and rationally trump the conflicting, imperfect, and unclear opinions that dominate the human realm, ideologies begin by discounting the concrete world of pre-theoretical life.

It is not just coincidence that ideologies share this structure with naturalism of rejecting the obvious, experienced world and constructing a new and neater one. Ideologies take on this structure because they ape naturalism. This seems to be because the natural sciences provide in our culture the model of how to theorize. And like naturalism, ideologies generally must start with the notion that the real world is not the one available to common human opinion and with the correlate notion that human opinion too must be explained by this real world that their
story maps by identifying its basic objects and laws. It is fundamental to naturalism and to other ideologies to deny that our basic experiences are truthful, however inadequate, and to claim, instead, that they are things, causes and effects, explainable like things. But the real world they map is in truth a theoretically constructed world, and it must be an absurd one to the extent that they deny that pre-theoretical evidence grounds and can correct the account. After all, if the real world were not given, however imperfectly, in basic human experience, no amount of our theorizing could get us there. And if the mind and its reasoning were drained of their veracity and unmasked as merely thingly effects of something else, as this type of theorizing presumes, no amount of reason-giving and evidence-finding could move us toward the truth.

Ideology originally was to be the “scientific” psychological explanation of human ideas. Ideologies, in the pejorative contemporary sense, always involve a moment of the pseudoscientific reification and explanation of our beliefs. They attempt to dismiss normal human experience, to deprive it of its validity, in order to put some idealized system in its place. The response to ideology must be a true study of ideas, one that lets ideas be ideas rather than turning them into things to be explained away and controlled.

Aurel Kolnai writes that Husserl’s *Experience and Judgment* “propounds a grandiose vista of absolute anti-Cartesianism: the discovery, as original as it is epoch-making, but Aristotelian in spirit, that our valid and strict ‘scientific’ or ‘philosophical’ knowledge proceeds, not from a ‘minimum’ knowledge of certain and evident truth, but from our inexplicit world knowledge in all its wealth, manifoldness and implication of order.”\(^{25}\) Husserl often says that philosophy must be a presuppositionless science and that it, as first philosophy, provides foundations for the rest of human knowledge, everyday as well as scientific. But, as Kolnai saw clearly, phenomenology fulfills this Cartesian-sounding mission in an unCartesian way. It provides a foundation for knowledge by reflecting upon and understanding it, such that it can defend this nonphilosophical knowledge while also deepening and elevating it. And this is true of empirical as well as moral and practical knowledge. This is why Husserl can present his philosophy as reasserting the rights of *doxa*, opinion. “Essentially the path of knowledge is to ascend from *doxa* to *epistēmē*—it is simply that even concerning this ultimate goal, the origin and specific rights of the lower stages should not be forgotten.”\(^{26}\)

Kolnai points especially to sections seven to ten of *Experience and Judgment*.\(^{27}\) While not giving up on the claim that *episteme* really does go beyond everyday *doxa*, Husserl insists that knowledge builds upon it and cannot therefore reject the realm of opinion. Naturalism and scientific human sciences seem to claim that they discover the true, exact, and causally explained world behind the merely false show of the subjectively distorted realm that naïve humans live in. Husserl argues that they substitute a creation of their minds for the true world. As an unavoidable fact, science is accomplished by scientists, and scientists are people, too: the conclusions of scientists need to build upon rather than reject this world that appears to humans in common, and scientists must return to this realm to verify and give meaning to their conclusions. Particular ideologies, I suggest, have a parallel form to naturalism: they do not claim merely to discover true features of the world, but they claim to discover the true world according to which our appearances prior to their theory are false, and to explain how these
appearances themselves are generated by the unapparent world they purport to know.

Ideologism is unlike other ideologies in an important respect. It is motivated by the multiplicity of such theories asserting a hidden real world, and in response it asserts a subjectivistic skepticism—according to their theory, we are all caught in such systems of false appearances. Thus ideologism seems to suggest, unlike other ideologies, that there is no true world either hidden but scientifically knowable or available in common. There is just a multiplicity of opinions. But by calling the variety of ideologies the ultimate reality, which ideology-studies can uncover, ideologism takes on the shape of other ideologies. Since theorists committed to ideologism claim that by adopting an ideology a person’s other opinions are determined, they in their study of ideologies provide a dehumanizing explanation of people’s appearances, beliefs, and reasonings—just as other ideologies claim to do.

The defenders of ideologism sometimes argue for this theory by observing that human observations are never of raw data. We never experience a pristinely objective intuition of the facts. When we see something we interpret the data with the help of pre-established opinions and concepts. Thus, as I have been told, for example, what one see as a tree, another may see as a nymph; what you see as an act of kindness, I may see as a passive-aggressive attempt to keep me subjugated. The move that Kolnai represents as anti-Cartesian brilliance in Experience and Judgment might be taken as evidence of this claim. Husserl emphasizes that our basic experience of things in the world, the experience upon which the sciences build, involves never pure and clear, self-evident data, but givens that we accept from an “external horizon” of the assumed world, a horizon by which we anticipate things to be a certain way, more or less of a certain type and style. And every particular thing also has, according to Husserl’s analysis of perception, an “internal horizon,” a set of expectations on our part that the given object has certain features we do not yet directly encounter. Given these rich and unarticulated assumptions, every given is interpreted by us, and not just experienced self-evidently.

Husserl’s analysis of our perceptions allows us to admit that subjective history and belief color our experiences. Still, we should not conclude with a subjectivistic skepticism, since as Husserl’s analysis also shows, the world and its objects are still given and with their own integrity. Even when some person sees a tree as potential lumber and another sees it as the body of a tree spirit, there is still a basic encounter with reality they share. The world of our past experience is the source of these anticipations, and often enough what the world gives us fails to fulfill our expectations. We experience such failures, too. The world is not putty in the hands of our assumptions.

Husserl argues in “The Origin of Geometry” that geometry comes from taking the shaped things of our concrete surrounding world and imaginatively pushing them toward ideal “limit shapes.” Geometry then progresses as a tradition, taught by one generation to the next and added to. The “developed capacity” to recognize the ground of geometry in our surrounding world is not passed on in geometry textbooks. This ground may even be forgotten, although it can always be retraced. Authentic thinking about abstract objects requires the “actually developed capacity for reactivating the primal beginnings” of our abstractions, recognizing how they are built intellectually out of materials from the experienced world. 28 This capacity must be personally developed and cannot be handed over in a formula—but it can be
Ideologies not only forget but deny their origins. They cut off the branch they are sitting on. They poison the spring we all drink from. They refuse our right to return to the true world to insightfully cash in their propositions. To respond to ideologies, we need this “developed capacity” for concreteness.

Ideologism alleges that we are all ideologues. It is the bad faith tu quoque response of those who want a free pass to profess their worldview. Ideologism unmask naturalism as just another ideology, and unmask the facts as just as arbitrary as values and everything else naturalism tells us belongs to the merely subjective false show that is the human world. But this whole style of thinking is a mistake.

In fact, neither worldviews nor human values float free. Even the worst are ultimately rooted in and are about the world we view and our life in it.

People too often turn away from aspects of the world that do not fit their system, and—as Weber says—a good teacher reminds students of “inconvenient facts” that do not flatter their party opinions. Husserl shows us a truth that is inconvenient for ideologists: human persons cannot avoid the question of truth and the norm of evidence, even when it comes to worldviews and values.

Teaching in the age of abstractions requires remembering our ground, that we find ourselves together, minded, and in the world—and then apprenticing and nurturing the capacity for concreteness.

Husserl as Teacher

“It is a discomforting, challenging, and troublesome philosophy that has no use for partisans and discipleship, that above all sends everyone off on the path of one’s own reflective thought.”

In the classroom, Husserl seems to have been an uncharismatic teacher wrapped up in his thoughts. Many students who would become significant thinkers in their own rights attended his classes, but the excitement that drew students to the phenomenological movement came from the content of his thought more than from his personality. The effect it had on Jean-Paul Sartre, though not a direct student of Husserl’s, illustrates what inspired many of his students. Raymond Aron told Sartre, as they were Frenchly discussing philosophy over drinks, that phenomenology allows one to philosophize about concrete human experience and about the things of real human life—even this wine bottle. It was love at first sight.

Modern philosophy, especially neo-Kantianism, still dominated. The modern philosophical dogma of the separation of the subject from the object, with the problem of knowledge that results, was overcome by Husserl’s recovery of intentionality, his rejection of psychologism, and his reaffirmation of the human connection with the world. An energizing concreteness and realism invited students to illuminate descriptively human experience of our world. The phenomenological groups that sprung up in German universities show how the Logical Investigations opened the windows and rejuvenated creative minds. It is this overcoming of modernity that prompted Kolnai, a passing student who would not call himself a
phenomenologist, to say that Husserl was perhaps the greatest philosopher since Aristotle and to suggest, “the future historiography of ideas...will set it down as a common place that with Husserl commences the non-Cartesian Age in European thought.”

Many of the early phenomenologists rejected Husserl’s later development, especially the epoché and transcendental idealism, precisely because his recovery of realism had convinced them so deeply. One of these early phenomenologists, Edith Stein worked with Husserl closely as an assistant soon after this transcendental turn. In her words, “All of us had the same question on our minds....The Logical Investigations had caused a sensation primarily because it appeared to be a radical departure from critical idealism which had a Kantian and neo-Kantian stamp....Knowledge again appeared as reception, deriving its laws from objects not, as criticism has it, from determination which imposes laws on the objects. All the young phenomenologists were confirmed realists. However, the Ideas included some expressions which sounded as though the Master wished to return to idealism.”

That many early students rejected his next big move shows, perhaps, that his lack of charisma had pedagogic value: they were taught not cowed; they were convinced by a man’s thoughts, not by a man. I think they misunderstood Husserl in rejecting transcendental reflection, but the point is that these “realist phenomenologists” saw in this turn a relapse into pre-phenomenological thinking, into the ideology of modern philosophy. Husserl rejected also a naïve objectivism, one that refused to take subjectivity seriously, and even if modern philosophy had emphasized subjectivity at the expense of objectivity and thus made a mess of both, Husserl was convinced that objectivism was as real a danger as subjectivism, since both block our understanding of the human encounter with the world. We must not make the world into a misadventure of the subject, but neither may we make the person just another element of the world.

Though Husserl as a teacher did not come across as terribly engaged with his students, it was according to himself in a teaching moment that he became truly philosophical. Lev Shestov had written several articles critical of Husserl, and in response Husserl had sent a request ahead of his arrival at a 1928 conference in Amsterdam that Shestov stay a few days longer so that they might meet and talk. He immediately addressed Shestov personally and generously, “with sincerity, enthusiasm, and inspiration.” First he defended himself: “You have turned me into a stone statue, raised me onto a lofty pedestal, and then with hammer-blows you have shattered this statue to bits. But am I really so lapidary?” This first defense is interesting. He resisted being turned into an inflexible and impersonal set of theories. If we approach fellow thinkers like that we may attack them or follow them, but we may not learn from them. Husserl encouraged his students to read the history of philosophy, but not to read it as historically done and gone.

It is possible that he failed to always approach other thinkers the way he wished to be approached. But this view of himself gives a clue about Husserl as a thinker and teacher. While presenting himself as the founder a movement and a leader into a new epoch of philosophy, he also insisted he was—and he truly was—always a beginner and a re-beginner. He felt an intense, personal responsibility to himself, his students, and fellow thinkers to be honest and radical in his defense of our search for knowledge.
Describing himself thirty years prior, he then said to Shestov, “To my own indescribable horror, I convinced myself that if contemporary philosophy has said the last word about the nature of knowledge, then we have no knowledge.” At this thought we should wonder, why teach? If all we teachers do is reinforce the modern or contemporary theories of non-knowledge, of locked mind-cabinets without keyholes or worldviews without windows on the world or ungroundable perception-permeating conceptual schemes, we are neither teaching knowledge nor encouraging and drawing out our students so they may discover knowledge on their own. Husserl then confessed to Shestov a personal moment of radical philosophical motivation:

Once, when I was giving a lecture at the university, expounding ideas I had taken over from our contemporaries, I suddenly felt like I had nothing to say, that I was standing before my students with empty hands and an empty soul. And then I resolved both for myself and for my students to submit the existing theories of knowledge to that severe and unrelenting criticism which has aroused the indignation of so many people.

This moment, he reported to Shestov, was the “origin of my *Logical Investigations*.”

His sense of philosophical responsibility, for himself as a thinker and as a teacher with influence over others, gave rise to what Husserl would become as a thinker and a teacher.

Descriptions of him while teaching formally and while talking with students, which he did often, indicate paradoxically that Husserl was both unengaged with his audience and intensely engaging. He would often speak almost as though speaking to himself. He monologued; he did not lead discussions or elicit participation. Even worse, his intense involvement with the objects of his thought seemed sometimes to distract him from the presence of other people. But, if we may flaunt current pedagogical nostrums, in doing so he still managed to teach, and perhaps teach better for it. We can guess that two things came across, often enough engagingly and even inspirationally: first, on the object side, that the topics of his thought are interesting, and second, on the subject side, that we should be, like him, intensely honest philosophically, searching for the truths of being and facing our responsibilities as thinkers. The result seems to have been many students who wanted to get to the truth of things and who felt not only free but obliged to disagree with “the Master.”

In 1966, Aron Gurwitsch eloquently described the effect Husserl had on him as a student:

When the author made his first acquaintance with Husserl’s philosophy about forty years ago, he was overwhelmed by the spirit of uncompromising integrity and radical philosophical responsibility, by the total devotedness which made the man disappear behind his work. Soon the young beginner came to realize the fruitfulness both of what Husserl had actually accomplished and of what he had initiated, the promise of further fruitful work.... It was the style of Husserl’s philosophizing, painstaking analytical work on concrete problems and phenomena rather than the opening up of large vistas, that made the young student take the decision to devote his life and work to the continuation and expansion of Husserl’s phenomenology—in a word, to remain a disciple forever, faithful to Husserl’s spirit and general orientation, but at the same time prepared to depart from particular theories if compelled to do so by the nature of the problems and the logic of the theoretical situation.

Being a disciple of Husserl could not mean being a mere follower. By disappearing behind the thought, by displaying sincerity and dedication to the truth, Husserl at his best drew out of his students a desire to be like him in crucial virtues without impressing on his students the desire to become another him or to act as his dummy.
From the point of view of someone interested in research on Husserl, it is frustrating that this thinker was so detail oriented, always working from the ground up, and repeatedly rethinking everything, even and especially the beginnings. But of course these are some of Husserl’s philosophical virtues. They manifest his sense of the responsibility that fallible human thinking has to the truth of being. Toward the end of his life, he commented to a former student, Adelgrundis Jaegerschmid, that philosophy must rededicate itself to the essential thing, “to truth.” “The question about ultimate being, concerning truth, must be the object of every philosophy. That is my life’s work.”

But this dedication to philosophy as a science, as knowledge of being and of the subjectivity that knows it, means also humility: “One must have the courage to admit and say that something that one still considered true yesterday, but that one sees to be an error today, is such an error. There is nothing absolute here.” The absolute truth that philosophy must seek to be itself—and especially the most important truth, about the absolute—is an infinite task, but this means philosophy is always on the way, always incomplete and beginning again.

I think Husserl is right in this characterization of philosophy, but it requires a lot of us.

Sometimes a student is looking for the absolute truth, especially about the most pressing practical questions of personal and communal life. When such a student meets a genius, it is easy to hold on too tightly, to be convinced too quickly that one has happened upon and can now possess the ultimate key that unlocks the meaning of it all. The impulse to genuine philosophy might then collapse into enrapture by a grand worldview or neat, all-explaining ideological system, and many who lack Husserl’s indefatigable philosophical conscience and daunting work ethic were, and are, more satisfied with that. Though Husserl said, as quoted above, that his life’s work was reorienting philosophy to its true telos of the truth of being, this is why Husserl also characterizes his “task for the world,” as showing “people through phenomenology a new modality of their responsibility in order to free them of their vanities and their ego.”

Husserl had his vanities, too. These included a belief that he had a mission from God to re-found philosophy—this time in its fullness—and a desire to have a group of students who would fulfill his work for him faithfully.

He influenced many, but his lack of continuers troubled him. Especially beginning in the late 1920s, others, raising existential and anthropological issues more starkly, stole his thunder. More than a few students rejected central parts of his philosophy. A few students even betrayed him personally. (His most influential student, Martin Heidegger, in letters from the 1920s brags of attacking his work while teaching and even of “wringing his neck,” writing in 1923 to fellow thinkers in the phenomenological milieu about the “old man”: “He lives off his mission as the ‘Founder of Phenomenology,’ but nobody knows what that means.”) Though he had many more students who were grateful to him and remained friends with him, even those students dedicated to him personally and philosophically were too independent minded to fulfill Husserl’s mission for him. Husserl wrote to former student Roman Ingarden in 1927, “it often weighs heavily on my soul that others in the circle of phenomenologists do not see this necessity” of the paths his thought had taken: “instead, they all prefer to follow their own way.”
While sick in the fall of 1937, in conversation with Jaegerschmid, he wished to have succeeded in freeing himself from vanity, “including the professional vanity without which a young person cannot work: the honor and admiration of my students.”  Part of this fault of Husserl’s reminds us of the natural allure of admiration. But for Husserl it was more complex. Ingarden described the situation beautifully:

The range of problems with which he occupied himself, problems which in their essence are entirely original and new, is enormous. Their solution, however, if they were all to be treated with the same exactness and intuitive vision, was undoubtedly beyond the spiritual powers of one man. But Husserl could not treat them in any other way, guided as he was by his great sense of responsibility, and his ethical approach to his whole philosophical activity. The task to which he devoted his life, and with the development of his personality was bound up, was—frankly speaking—impossible. No one could really help him with it. He often spoke of a generation of “selfless” researchers, who would devote themselves completely to the solution of the problems he had outlined. But of course that was just an illusion. Should such researchers be really “selfless,” they would be only simulacra of men, and not human beings of flesh and blood. As such they could never solve any of his problems. And should they be really human, it would be simply impossible for them in the Husserlian spirit.

In 1935, toward the end of his life and while being increasingly marginalized socially and intellectually within Germany, and even prevented from travelling abroad to conferences because, as ethnically Jewish, he was seen by the regime as not a proper representative of Germany, Husserl lamented to Jaeger-schmidt: “except for [Eugen] Fink, for the past four years I have not had one student to whom I could speak my mind....Now that I am seventy—I am seventy-six—I have no circle of students or the possibility to lecture, I lack the school that would want to take my thought further and publish them.” Still, later in conversations with her, he seems to remember that he is not the only person with the philosophical vocation requiring taking one’s own path, saying to Jaeger-schmidt, his student and confidant: “Promise me never to say anything just because others have said it.”

Part vanity and part self-consolation in the face of his inability to fulfill the impossible responsibility of a philosopher, this conceit—and its disappointment—stayed with Husserl, it seems, till the end, or at least close to it. Jaegerschmid reports, that “from Maundy Thursday on”—less than a fortnight before his death on April 26, 1938—“he did not speak one more word about his philosophical work, which had occupied him throughout the previous months. Just how much his entire life was subject to the mission of a higher power was revealed only as he was dying. Now he felt finally discharged and released from his task.”

**Conclusions**

“**In the path of true science, this path is endless. Accordingly, phenomenology demands that the phenomenologist foreswear the ideal of a philosophical system and yet as a humble worker in community with others, live for a perennial philosophy.**”

While restoring the validity of the experienced world, Husserl rehabilitates human reason as capable of and fulfilled in truth. His attacks on truth-obscurring dogmas can be understood as reminding reason of its work when it has been distracted and dejected by ideologies. For many thinkers, his call back to the things themselves was rejuvenating fresh air, opening the windows
of the modern mind.

His claim to make philosophy a science must not be misunderstood. This science, like all others, is accomplished by human beings, is never perfect, and must be done with the help of others, both contemporary coworkers and those long dead. About himself, Husserl wrote, “If he has been obliged, on practical grounds, to lower the ideal of the philosopher to that of a downright beginner, he has at least in his old age reached for himself the complete certainty that he should thus call himself a beginner.”49

Also struggling to become genuine beginners, those he influenced went in all directions doing their own thing. At the end, he says, “I seek not to instruct, but to lead, to point out and describe what I see. I claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights, principally before myself but in the same manner also before others, as one who has lives in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence.”50 Yet he was disappointed that he lacked phenomenological heirs, faithful students who might carry out the “infinite tasks” of philosophy as he wanted. His lack of followers must not be taken as a failure. With Husserl’s help, we can insightfully understand and reject ideologies. We then can appreciate the great and varied work lying before our fallible reason and be thankful that good teachers are not gurus. The quality of a teacher cannot be judged by his students’ mistakes when they have failed to follow him faithfully, but it can be judged if his students have merely followed him faithfully.

Though unpoltical, Husserl’s life’s work can be seen as profoundly anti-ideological. One of his students, Jan Patočka, had another student, Czech dissident Václav Havel, who wrote bravely of ideology: “To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course, one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’s own reason, conscience, and responsibility.” It is most of all in defense of reason, conscience, and responsibility that Husserl’s philosophy is animated, and we see Husserl’s reverberations in Havel’s claim that “the human predisposition to truth” is ultimately what is at issue in our response to ideology.51

We might conclude by pointing to Patočka’s dissident death in Prague and to Wojtyła’s courageous crusade to build a church in Kraków as evidence that Husserl’s influence bore heroic fruit in the struggles against ideology and totalitarianism, which must also be struggles for the integrity of the person as reasonable, responsible, and called to live in truth. But giving him this credit would be a stretch, and self-defeating. Honesty would then force us to debit him for the many ideological failings of those he influenced. Instead, each thinker must take responsibility for himself, and it is a mark of Husserl’s success as a teacher and leader that his students and admirers went in their many own directions.
Notes


4. Husserl, Crisis, 299.


17. His student Aron Gurwitsch puts the Husserlian position as follows: “Philosophy is concerned with human welfare and has to promote it. It cannot do so except by contributing knowledge and by criticizing knowledge already acquired. In other words, philosophy has to become knowledge in the sense of episteme, not satisfied so long as it has to carry along implications and presuppositions not yet cleared up, seeking to expand itself to all fields of being. This task, perhaps, is an infinite one; at any rate it does require the cooperation of generations. But for the sake of the supreme practical interests of mankind—if not for theoretical needs—this task must be tackled. We may be sure that the more we proceed in its realization, the more reasonable life will become, the more it will become human life. Hence, I think, we ought to persist on the path opened by Husserl, regardless of the higher or lower esteem we will enjoy as philosophic personalities because we are mere disciples,” (in “Review of Jean Héring’s ‘La Phénoménologie d’Edmund Husserl il y a trente ans,’” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1940), 515).


23. Husserl, Crisis, 16


34. Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher;” 450.
44. Roman Ingarden, “Edith Stein on her Activity as an Assistant to Edmund Husserl,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 23, no. 2 (Dec. 1962), 155–75; 159–60