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2017

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**Recommended Citation**

Ranasinghe, N. (2017). *The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship* by John Von Heyking. *International Political Anthropology* 10(1): 39-55.

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# *The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship* by John Von Heyking

*Nalin Ranasinghe*

## **Abstract**

Heyking's ascent from Aristotle to Plato implies that something Platonic was lost in Aristotle's accounts of friendship and politics. Plato's views on love and soul turn out to have more in common with early Christianity. Stressing differences between eros and thumos, using Voegelin's categories to discuss the Platonic Good, and expanding on Heyking's use of Hermes, I show how tragic culture and true politics can be further enhanced by refining erotic friendship, repudiating Augustinian misanthropy, positing minimum doctrines about soul and city, and basing reason on Hermes rather than Apollo.

**Keywords:** Plato, Aristotle, Voegelin, Eros, Thumos, friendship, soul, Von Heyking

## **Introduction**

John von Heyking's book on friendship is as easy to read as it is hard to review. Though pleasant to peruse, it's also difficult to march through. Heyking invites interruption in as much as he befriends his readers and forces them to converse with him, thus interrupting the smooth flow of swift reading that is so prized in an age of executive summaries, skimming and instant understanding. This work is also timely as it appears in a super-heated political atmosphere, one in which even sincere and time-tested friendships become unhinged. We see how savage events tear apart jointly held and seemingly atomic or un-splittable foundational values into oppositely charged ideals. This tie between friendship and politics is of the utmost significance as it has been seen, since Classical Athens, that the political realm is based on the extension or overflowing of friendship. Trusting in the gift of Logos, the frank and rational speech that is an essential part of friendly discourse, we need no longer sanctify and shroud in secrecy what is archaic and absurd about our culture; a civilization's strength lies in its power to confess and learn from its errors, instead of stubbornly justifying them. But while civilization will implode if we fail to defend politics from pressures to link up and network or gang up and discriminate, its very basis is refuted if we deny a soul's power to rise above its genetic roots and behold via eidetic means the beauty of another.

## **Plato's Eros and Christ's teachings on love**

While Heyking identifies subtle differences between Plato and Aristotle, he also drew my attention to deep affinities between Plato's Eros and Christ's teachings on love. Perhaps the true followers of Socrates and Jesus have to unite in a spirit of friendship if mankind and the Earth are to be saved from extremist advocates of violent *Thumos* or heartless *Noos*? We also see how love, long a furtive fugitive and rootless refugee, may be shown a viable path to a robust citizenship, affirmed by mind and desires. For this to occur, and the catholic nature of the

Western tradition to be shared, we must regain the experiences of ‘soul’ and ‘polis’ after two millennia of alienation and abstraction. Living together must be for the good life, and noble actions not just for life.<sup>1</sup> Pious world-denial and vain scientific materialism both reject Nietzsche’s fervent plea that the earth be given a human meaning;<sup>2</sup> they derive from misanthropic outlooks that pre-empt the possibility of friendship and see the soul as something unruly, to be managed and saved from itself. While this attitude is nascent in Aristotle, it is compounded by Augustine’s barbarous assault on the City and Man. His Carthaginian curse on the city, Dido’s deferred revenge on Rome, must be lifted before soul or city can live freely again. Reading beside Heyking, I will indicate some of the deeper implications of his book.

We start from Aristotle’s tendency to split *philia* into either a divine link with god’s Mind that cannot be shared with another (why friends do not let friends become gods)<sup>3</sup> or a mimetic bond between men who unreflectively confirm, celebrate and embody their regime’s morality, deriving pleasure and pain therefrom.<sup>4</sup> But it may be that true friends’ and friendship’s adherence to the Good, what Voegelin calls the *Agathon*,<sup>5</sup> is a stance that helps a virtuous soul endure changing contexts with grace instead of being ruled by them<sup>6</sup>; while the Platonic Good is said to be beyond Being<sup>7</sup>, the object of Aristotelian contemplation, it also sustains human virtue and grace through history’s flux, empowering us to fight the urge to settle for the norm and seek stable sameness. This erotic Platonism sets Heyking’s book above other works on friendship. The hierarchical relation he describes, a vertical alignment between the Good, the friend and the polity, gives indirect but humanly valid hints of an ontological basis neither tragic Hannah Arendt nor thumotic Leo Strauss can offer; it also shows the silent majority of believers, spiritual and patriotic, a source of dignity and love the intertwined extremes of religious dogmatism and hi-tech post-humanism lack. These stances overtly deny a soul’s integrity and freedom.

Heyking’s account of friendship is based on the first phenomenon in the order of experience, what Aristotle calls *sunaitthesis*, or, as Heyking puts it, a common or mutual perception of the good shared by friends.<sup>8</sup> Yet unlike Aristotle, for whom pure *sunaitthesis* is an unerotic *intellectual* experience that seems distinct from that of citizens celebrating the splendor of their constructed polity, a disjunction corresponding to his basic separation of the moral and intellectual virtues, Heyking sets up a genuinely positive view of human political life, one the philo-sopher, far from creating and then warily contemplating, truly participates in. Instead of using political science to build a cave to protect us from the worse traits of human nature but only ends up alienating the soul from the Good, this Eric Voegelin-inspired example of Platonic political art seeks to reveal and celebrate the beauty of the cosmic order. But these lofty goals are presently beyond us; our first aim should be to grasp *sunaitthesis*’s meaning before discerning its role in Heyking’s project.

Heyking suggests that the Good/Agathon receives objective corroboration by being apprehended by more than one person. It ceases to be a subjective delusion of the kind held by men such as Don Quixote when, as C.S. Lewis puts it, another is there to say ‘What? You too? I thought I was the only one.’<sup>9</sup> Here, of course, it is not a religious statement being made but a claim about the beauty of the cosmos as opposed to the order of nature or regime. But it could fairly be said that the ideal becomes real, almost regardless of the validity of this claim beyond the dyad of the friendship, by the erotic event of friendship. This helps us to interpret E. M. Forster’s wish to possess the moral power to betray his country before he would betray a friend;<sup>10</sup> the state is a thumotic abstraction without the living grace of true friendship. As Heyking implies, a nation, and even politics itself, derive all their moral authority from the divine

power of friendship; apart from the friend rescuing us from solipsism, friendship also confirms our best self; who we really are. Instead of the vertiginous horror of the isolated self or the thuggish collective ego of thumos, friendship reacquaints us with the better angels of our own soul and since the Greek for nature, *phusis*, means grow, helps that self to grow, thrive and realize its goal, or *telos*. Thus, self-knowledge itself is gained by friendship. In short, the polis does not define *philia*, erotic friendship gives birth to true politics.

Heyking moves from Aristotle's definition of *sunaitthesis* as 'common or mutual perception of the good' to saying that 'I behold the good while beholding you behold the good; we hold the good together while beholding one another.'<sup>11</sup> We behold the good through, in and with the friend; the old familiar words for this moment of communion can be also viewed in terms that are erotic, and in that sense transcendental, rather than religious or civic. Perhaps the link between the religious and philosophic senses of *sunaitthesis* can best be seen when one recalls the Gospel of Luke's story of the risen Jesus appearing before two once and future disciples on the road to Emmaus;<sup>12</sup> somehow it is only through the activity of the common meal, rather than by the stranger's account of how things had to occur in a certain way, that the two persons saw Jesus or, rather, saw each other see Jesus and, in a sense, only saw Jesus in their other self, for the man they then knew to be Jesus vanished as soon as the identification was made. Further, it was only through the friends' confirmation of the self-same powerful feeling that 'their hearts were afire' that this emotion, and the transcendent but once temporal incarnation of the good it pointed towards, was objectively verified. Later, this feeling of community and the energy it generated could be viewed as the basis for the experience shared by many more at the feast of Pentecost. We try to keep these foundational events alive and timeless in the cave or church by sacred myths that translate their mystical content into rituals and linked stories.

### Sunaitthesis

The first and most definitive example our book gives of *sunaitthesis* goes back 300 years, to the War of the Spanish Succession and the special relationship that existed between John Churchill, the 1<sup>st</sup> Duke of Marlborough, and Prince Eugene, his Imperial opposite number.<sup>13</sup> This startling choice passing over more recent and familiar historical ties, such as those forged between the Duke's descendent, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt (where Roosevelt gleefully promoted the liquidation of the British Empire) or the more recent and far less turbulent relationship that Margaret Thatcher set up with Ronald Reagan (to which Heyking only alludes but does not single out) certainly suggests that they do not measure up to the high bar this book sets up. While 'Maggie' and 'Ronnie' found common cause in the destruction of the state and their devotion to corporate interests at the expense of human rights, hardly appropriate goals for politicians let alone statesmen, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson only were reconciled long after the vicious rivalries that marked their years in active politics. By contrast, Churchill, himself a historian of note, tells us that Marlborough and Eugene found relief in their friendship from 'the intrigues, cross purposes, and half-measures of a vast, unwieldy coalition trying to make war.'<sup>14</sup> Heyking gently implies that genuine virtue friendship between real statesmen, in the truest sense of this aristocratic ideal, is obsolete in a once oligarchic and now demagogic age filled with dodgy dossiers, smug sanctimony and crafty calculation. We think of Tony Blair and his support for the Iraq War.

But a relationship of absolute trust between persons engaged in the highest political

activities seems anachronistic and absurd today. Surely the first priority should be given to family over friends? Isn't money making and the commodious living promised by Hobbes<sup>15</sup> far more consistent with human nature than the good life? Didn't Augustine even denounce the pagans for their belief that virtue could withstand evil?<sup>16</sup> Shouldn't we accept his view that the state exists only to punish sinners<sup>17</sup> and to censure the sinful hubris of those praising splendid pagan virtues? After attributing today's failure of politics to modern leaders' incapacity for virtue friendship,<sup>18</sup> Heyking audaciously performs a tiger's leap over two millennia of modern and medieval political theory to deploy long-forgotten Platonic terms that yet reside close beside the origin of the polis and Western civilization itself.

Repudiating Augustine, who boldly proclaimed the end of the age of miracles, condemned as demonic any power that sought to connect the transcendent with the temporal, and pretty much justified war and *realpolitik* amidst the ruins of the city-state he gleefully denounced, Heyking speaks of a daimonic man who breaks through barriers built by sin and suspicion to reconcile us with the divine cosmos and each other. Deftly connecting Churchill's recognition of the daimonic genius to its original source, Heyking takes us from the territory of shamans and witchdoctors to Plato's account in the *Symposium* of 'one who is wise in the whole intercourse and conversation of gods with human beings.'<sup>19</sup> If even this mildly mystical idiom may be too much for our positivistic times, and also give offence to those who call Jesus the only way to God, we have Voegelin's account of the '*daimonios aner*' who 'lives in the tension between needy and full being.'<sup>20</sup> Eros traverses and symbolizes 'the poles of temporal and eternal being' and makes it possible for the human and divine to 'partake in one another.' The erotic man is also 'the measure of right' and has great charisma or 'the power of influence on others.'<sup>21</sup>

## Eros

This Dionysian power is certainly far from unfamiliar today, especially as we seek to repudiate some of the soul-deadening demands made by modernity; but even as we recoil from the deadly charisma of men such as Mao and Hitler, we must also affirm the reality of the erotic spiritual power for the good exuded by the likes of Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, Martin Luther King, or Popes John XXIII and Francis. In Voegelinian terms, these people differentiated and revived faiths and cultures that had become abstract and self-serving; even despite incurring vilification and hatred, they redirected their reified traditions towards the *Agathon*. Further, even many *bien pensants* of the non-religious world concede that the efforts and exertions of these individuals were sustained by a force of goodness beyond the quantifiable aspects of reality.

Heyking's main point is that the divine is not unfriendly towards humanity; nor, *pace* Aristotle, do the gods discourage human fellowship or politics.<sup>22</sup> To the extent to which we see that persons of daimonic rather than demonic genius are not seeking to use the gods or usurp the powers of the devil but merely want to liberate us from captivity in a living sepulcher of self-hatred and post-Christian misanthropy, we may find that the categories of friendship are not oligarchic and limited to a few but truly cosmic and available to all. They are the very means by which generic anthropoids become uniquely differentiated *aner*. The Voegelian ecumenism Heyking espouses here is thus strikingly distinct from a Christianity that looks back yearningly to its tribal exclusivist origins in the taboos and prohibitions of Moses' jealous God. Any cosmopolitan outlook based on friendship is opposed to oligarchic values (of the few) based on

reproduction, family and money. These are the commercial morals and economic fetishes Hobbes substituted for political rights when he denied virtue or friendship and declares the war of all against all.

There is no place for virtue friendship in the commercial state set up by Hobbes, neither is there any such thing as the soul-based lasting happiness the Greeks once called 'Eudaimonia', or flourishing. While Aristotle promised a place, the polis, where ordinary virtue would be rewarded by happiness,<sup>23</sup> and Augustine piously raged against this concept, declaring that the very quest for happiness apart from God is evidence of man's depraved nature,<sup>24</sup> it is the inveterate anti-Aristotelian Hobbes who consummated the bishop's devastation of the city and sets out to understand everything in terms of fear, endemic suspicion and power. Heyking astutely finds the truest cause of this collapse of politics in the failure of friendship. Faced with our eternal guilt and moral indebtedness towards a God who know us better than we know ourselves, it is clear that friendship between men had no future in Augustine's worldview. But things got even worse when Luther and Hobbes brushed aside Aquinas' synthesis of Aristotle's Philosophy and Christianity; their restored Augustinianism ruled men through fear. Believing that the restless motion of human desire was sinful and could only be arrested by power, this outlook had no place at all for friends who would recognize and bring out the best potential of each other. Indeed, the anti-teleological wrath of Hobbes and his kind denied the possibility of actualizing potential; all that existed was raw power or potential only for violence.<sup>25</sup> Like matter, this toxic energy is in constant and ceaseless motion; it could never have purpose, meaning or form. Thus only Mephistopheles, the spirit of perpetual negation,<sup>26</sup> could be Faust's companion.

Although the true statesman has much power at his disposal, he knows that its potential exists to be actualized and must not be hoarded (as weaponry, data or money) or sought for its own sake. The quasi-divine power to destroy, enslave or objectify replaces the truly human ability to know lovingly and live alongside in a way that leads to mutual edification; Heyking explains that the incapacity to practice friendship drives men to seek power over others and chase impossibly utopian goals; the sad reality is that this attitude only leads them to 'dig deeper holes into their own souls.'<sup>27</sup> Building the very caves Plato spoke of, men who try to control others by power and thus escape the need to have friends only end up becoming alienated from reality, the rest of humanity, and even themselves. It is even more dangerous to see God in this way. Many of the Reformers and Moderns, despite trying to escape the cruelties done in His name, wound up imitating the God of Power and Might as they sought to create heaven on earth. Yet, even in Homer, friendship is seen as a divine attribute; the vital transition from *Iliad* to *Odyssey* is marked by a change in the ways of gods toward man caused by Achilles' death,

Heyking draws attention to the quality of the hidden tie between gods and men by his focus on a banquet scene from Book IX of the *Odyssey*.<sup>28</sup> Divinely rich Alkinoos, despite being praised to the skies by his wily guest, is strangely dependent on tales told in song of the feats and sufferings of mortal men. It seems that Homer's Phaiakians, though leading lives of effortless luxury, crave something more; as it is hardly credible that these men could derive joy from hearing of heroic feats they had no connection to, it is more likely that the Olympia gods are the real auditors of Homer's songs and the spectators of mortal excellence. Even if the several gods spark the excellence at stake — whether martial, technical, erotic, musical or intellectual — these qualities matter little when they do not suffer the passion they inspire in mortals. Bluntly put, these gods are as lacking in self-knowledge as the one-eyed Cyclopes; they can only know themselves indirectly by being reflected in heroic feats. It also follows that since a hero cannot

bear the power of a god without buckling under the pressure put on their soul by a willful and overeager driver, the choice of *Aristeia* literally carries with it the curse or blessing of a short but glorious career of fully or over-actualized existence. It takes a true man, an *aner*, to choose and be chosen to rise out of the generic ‘anthropocity’ of the species and be impregnated by a god. This is why the gods feast, literally and figuratively, on the sublimely beautiful actions of the ‘Best of the Achaeans.’

Odysseus’ appearance before the gods signified that the age of vicarious divine sport had ended. While the hero would go home to inaugurate a pre-democratic polis, where a worthy swineherd and cowherd would live as his son’s equals,<sup>29</sup> the gods themselves would soon become the constant and eternal ideas of Plato; these divine forms or “looks” would be implanted deeper, in our soul rather than merely being reflected on men’s bodies. The truth would also be recollected through the divine gift of logos, rather than by merely recounting boastful myths of hubris filled violence or cautionary tales about jealous and capricious divinities. Such a measure truly reconciles the divine and human in a non-adversarial way.

While the great Attic Tragedies actualized the penultimate step in this process, warning Dionysus against hubris while revealing limits even Apollo could not cross, Plato’s dialogues and the original common meal of Christianity took this theophany to a level not yet surpassed. If Jesus exorcised souls afflicted by the Satan of self-hatred, battled ritual uncleanness, and promises the return and reconciliation of the angry human spirit (prodigal Dionysus) to his loving father in heaven, then Socrates stands for the soul’s power to bear the divine gift of logos and resist furies of demotic rage and false filial piety. He even sacrificed his life to prove that the gods were benign and just. As Plato suggests, evil is tied to false opinions about gods. In a vital sense, the logos, standing for both the divine gift of reason and the incarnation reveals bonds between gods and man. The best life is ruled by reason, proportion and prudence; it does not need to be enslaved by priestly laws or sacred texts that reduce virtue to animal fertility and ritual piety.

There is a difference between mere quantitative reproduction of sameness and the celebration of one’s free participation in the cosmic regime of beauty and love that make the world beautiful. The one dutifully obeys an *ex-nihilo* creator god who reaps what he did not sow and loves things only because they are his own property; the other has to do with sharing the wonder and joy that God gets from loving and being love itself. Now things become free and slaves become friends; it is this mutual recognition of common humanity between god and man or master and slave that serves as the basis for both friendship and the city itself.

We must now see how Heyking moves from the mutual recognition of souls and the Good, as opposed to the nihilistic equality of all amidst meaningless motion of matter, to found a genuine city. It is only by Plato and Aristotle’s recognition of the soul’s freedom and potential to bear virtue, an admission neither Hobbes nor Augustine could grant, that makes the deferred promise of Christianity and the emancipatory and egalitarian passions of modernity meaningful. Even though we must retain the aristocratic vertical differentiation between higher and lower forms of life made by the Greeks, this is merely oligarchic unless the early Christian and post-modern widening of the horizontal axis, granting that this capacity for virtue exists even in the souls of slaves, barbarians and women, is fully accepted; in short, only in a true city is this potential seen, challenged, educated and realized.

Many close readers of the Ancients either blur the distinction between Plato and Aristotle or thoughtlessly accept Aristotle’s rather catty and very literal reading of the dialogues

of Plato. In do so, they miss up on the opportunities for opening up a genuine conversation or dialogue between these two great minds that could lead to a belated albeit partial *sunaisthesis*; this would also reveal the significant differences in their world-views and prior assumptions. While this is not the goal of Heyking's book, he draws vital distinctions between Plato and Aristotle that help us see stark differences between their respective political ideas and ontologies.

It should first be understood that Plato was not Aristotle's "teacher" any more than Socrates was Plato's. Bluntly put, the assumption that there is a body of esoteric doctrine handed down from wise master to brilliant pupil is clearly refuted by the tragic fact of Socrates' inability to reform or teach Alcibiades, despite the erotic attraction that existed between them. Also, unlike Socrates and Plato, who saw themselves as lovers of wisdom, Aristotle saw himself as a wise man, capable of imparting wisdom *qua* science to any sufficiently clever disciple by means that are genetic rather than eidetic. He even have been offended by Plato's inability or refusal to teach what he knew; he replaces Plato's Good, daimonic eros and philosophy with Being, *Noos* and the wise man. Oddly anticipating Descartes, the mind replaces the soul and scientific generosity outbids impotent philosophic eros. Aristotle believes that the city can be built so as to give happiness to any normal person made virtuous by it. His *sunaisthesis* with *Noos* leads him to build a model of a city that Alexander will then replicate all over the Hellenized world.

If so, Aristotle's account of *philia* in Book VIII of the Ethics is only for the semi-philosophic *phronimoi* or auxiliary guardians who care for ultimate particulars i.e. practical matters. True thinkers have far better things — animals, plants and ideas — to study when they are free from cave duty. They have trans-political and truly intellectual interests. It follows that Heyking's modified model of the polis must lead the many from the manufactured necessities of the cave and help us see that human souls are the noblest beings a man can see or study; so, philosophy must return to the cave and Aristotle's *Noos* must be eroticized. We must move 'from Aristotle's horizon of common sense outward toward Plato's daimonic horizon.'<sup>30</sup>

For both Plato and Aristotle, the process of deliberation about the common good, government for the people, clearly comes before government by the people, though it presupposes that those who care for the good of the people are able to govern them. Since a common good does not necessarily exist just because we desire it, we can easily imagine situations where ethnic groups with conflicting ends (such as the Israelis and Palestinians) are somehow expected to co-exist in the same small strip of land, and many groups in conflict do not even desire to share in the same common good, even if they see that their very survival demands it, we see that the desires of people must be educated towards a common good.

It is also clear to any student of history that man does not live by bread alone; as necessary as material necessities are to continued human life, there are many cases where religious taboos or cultural prohibitions lead men *qua* demos to prefer death to the loss of meaning that follows from performing certain actions.

This is why the task of renewing cultural roots in a way that elevates men from fractious anthropic existence to horizons of meaning that inspire the good life of an *aner* is closely related to *sunaisthesis*; admiration of the noble things that lead one out of the cave. The problem is not with the cave; human life is rooted in an animal substrate that cannot be denied. It is that this will to live must not allowed to become a closed labyrinth or false thumotic nature, one that consumes its own children by denying access to truth, transcendence or *telos*. It is unjust that many parents live as gods, finding banal immortality by seeing themselves reflected in children or grandchildren but never treating these offspring as autonomous souls.

But if the irrationally sacred is to be prevented from becoming the enemy of the truly divine, it would well behoove statesmen to employ influences that naturally lead the soul beyond itself instead of relying on coercive means; it is here that the dialectical methods of Socrates seem most effective. Aristotle's way of mass-producing moral virtues works perfectly when beginning *ex-nihilo*, either due to a new founding or prior destruction, is possible; Alexander did for Aristotle what Alcibiades could or would not do for Socrates. But the risk is that these new ways of virtue could turn mindlessly centripetal; youth would learn to worship ancestors and deny their own spiritual powers. They would not look to transcendent reality.

Heyking seeks to introduce admirable forms of virtue indirectly; trusting that when we see noble deeds we will be driven to first mutually reflect on the causes of these actions and then go on to discover and refine each other by these deliberations. But just as Socrates' mission inspired Plato's erotic dialogues but were then seemed superseded by Aristotle's scientific analyses, or Jesus' short loving life and ugly crucifixion first gave rise to oral synoptic traditions, only to be followed by the priest-friendly High Christology of John's gospel, the subtle danger is that a pseudo-omniscient theoretical frame will try to contain the event and exclude what was transcendent and sublime about the original occasion; the city's claims to sufficiency, the pride of the doomed sons of Abraham before Christ,<sup>31</sup> is thus paralleled by the self-styled wise man's dangerously deluded belief that he is beyond wonder. Such people will also seek and frequent the company of other like men to sustain this illusion via self-congratulatory pseudo-friendships that are as devoid of erotic energy as they are closed to awe, generosity or vulnerability.

To the extent that Aristotle places the pure intellectual virtues above the artificial moral virtues, he will focus intellectual contemplation on the natural and celestial while relegating the human virtues Socrates studied to the level of the merely habitual and mimetic. What Plato treated ironically in the *Republic*, Aristotle first reads literally and mocks before silently imitating. In other words, Aristotle has no objections to a state of affairs where, while Spartans live by one sacred code of morality, the Cretans or Athenians in turn feast their eyes upon another and operate under very different laws. Each and every one of these language games will differ according to regime, but the basic intent of maintaining order within the polity will be served in each case. Even when an Alexander will set up an empire, he will show all due respect for local traditions as long as they preserve order.

While the Roman way expected more uniformity between the many parts of their empire, its *telos* was still ultimately about oligarchic tradition and legal continuity; the Romans were far too pragmatic to be concerned about whether or not they were living up to an eternal or transcendental standard. As Voegelin astutely observed of Cicero's claim to engage in philosophy, 'there are no problems in Cicero, whenever there is one insolent enough to come near the surface, the firm hand of the Roman consul and imperator comes down and bends it under the yoke of his authoritarian language.'<sup>32</sup> This also meant that friends could never look towards or love some idea both too high to be attained but yet near enough to bring out what is best in their respective souls. Rather, the utilitarian aspects of the relationship would inevitably emerge as the parties played "whack-a-mole" with whatever threatened to disrupt the order of the oligarchy. We cannot see Cicero and his kind extending the franchise or benefits of the good life to the riff-raff or urban poor; the patrician order depended too much on exploitation of their privileges to entertain such sentiments. Although Cicero claimed to be the savior of the Roman Republic by putting down the populist Cataline and accusing him of treason, we recall how the Gracchi were as murderously treated as the Kennedy brothers for the presumption of trying to

feed the urban poor. Even if an oligarch cloaks himself in Burkean platitudes and speaks of gradual change, he feeds off jam from yesterday and hints of jam for all tomorrow, but he jams today shut.

This negative or other-opposed oligarchic ontology thus contrasts to the liberality of an ignorance-based Socratic outlook; while Socrates always seeks grace from outside of himself from a cosmos he trusts in, oligarchs must continually fight the piously repressed Dionysian element in city and soul. This demotic power seeks self-knowledge and recognition while rejecting the self-denial and guilt imposed on it. While the oligarchic emphasis on conserving and reproducing the same is based on and best understood through the values of economics and family, the erotic soul, employing eidetic rather than genetic ties, prefers individual qualities to generic quantities. But these erotic ends are fostered by the lost aristocratic code and tragic values of friendship and politics. Again, Voegelin put it best when he said that, for one such as Cicero 'Rome is the ideal materialized.'<sup>33</sup> It was in this spirit that Hegel 'suspended the contradiction subjectivity and objectivity' in his late *Philosophy of Right*;<sup>34</sup> any tension between the ideal and the real is piously denied. A less ponderous example would be the claim made by a groom at his wedding that his new wife is both his soul mate and best friend. Hera is not only the Queen of Zeus, she is also the goddess of jealousy, the thumotic love of what is said to be one's own by what is said to be natural law. Once same-sex friendship is renounced on Hymen's altar, it becomes the love that cannot speak its own name and the destruction of politics by pious hypocrisy is total. Eros is unarmed.

We are discussing a situation, one Heyking is seeking to remedy, where Gresham's Law can be applied to friendship: today, counterfeit or debased friendship has driven the genuine article out of circulation. But, unlike gold, true friendship is not something that can be preserved as a potentiality or promised on a given date; as a partially divine form of psychic energy, friendship ceases to exist when it is not in erotic motion. Here it is quite unlike its dapper doppelganger; false political friendship is neither political nor friendship. It is not political because the true form of politics is friendship. This means that the sort of politics that can exist in the absence of true friendship is a kind of oligarchic alliance formed for the sake of advantage. It is usually born of desire for money or power, "utility friendship" as Aristotle puts it;<sup>35</sup> or spawned by Schmittian spite when the enemy of my enemy is my friend. By contrast, true friendship is the origin of politics; just as marriage is said to be for children, friends naturally cause each other to love the world more and also bequeath for polis and posterity permanent memorials of what true *philia* brought them to see in heaven and each other. This power to realize the potential of both divine ideas and human souls is the best sign of friendship; it is in this grace-filled sanctuary, where the Good is brought into being by the *daimon* of *philia*, that the city and true politics exist. We see a Voegelinian triad<sup>36</sup> of erotic entities: soul, polis and cosmos<sup>36</sup> parallel a second triad: body, oikos and nature. The soul's choice between them pits the City of God against the City of Man.

In other words, we must distinguish the kind of friendship that does not go beyond itself from what is erotic and generous. To the extent that it seeks to gain bodily immortality through order and stability, appealing to nature and nature's gods and denying the soul's truth or growth, this *thumo-philia* is as ungenerous as it is exclusive. Men who do not feel (or even try to repress) the deep psychic tension between the ideal and the real end up reproducing the baser aspects of their natures; Shakespeare's Antony put it best when he warned Caesar's killers that while 'the evil men do lives after them, the good is oft interred with their bones.'<sup>37</sup> It is only by the city that

grace is conveyed from one generation to the next. True *philia* must pass over the valley of the bones to make virtue dance. Meanwhile what Nietzsche calls ‘The eternal return of the same,’<sup>38</sup> our ‘natural triad’ of body, *oikos* and nature preserves the conditions for the possibility of the re-emergence of virtue and beauty on the earth. It is a measure of the desperate character of our time that what even the pessimistic Nietzsche could not have imagined is now a permanent threat; nature itself is very much at the mercy of an overgrown *oikos* or human economic realm, one that outstrips all bounds of necessity in pursuing an adversarial relationship with nature and human existence itself. This is why it is desperately necessary that the categories of eros, logos and *philia* be reintroduced to prevent the alliance forged between demented conservatism and doctrinaire religion from visiting a fate on the planet worse than anything Hitler or Stalin could have chosen to inflict on their enemies. Only ‘the moral horizon of friendship’<sup>39</sup> can save the world and ourselves from the adversarial view of reality that paranoid apocalyptic religion and solipsistic libertarianism hold in common.

A further aspect of friendship Heyking zeroes in on is how the non-economic aspects of human reality are seen under this moral horizon. Unlike financial deliberation, which is ultimately a kind of calculation that could be performed more efficiently by artificial intelligence for an *oikos*, or household, the light or grace of friendship brings into visibility a sort of gift economy where mutual benefit and generosity reign. Aristotle describes how the wealthy can gain true lasting happiness, or at least glory, by turning their wealth into honor.<sup>40</sup> To the extent that they make the polis more just, by giving the deserving but ill-equipped poor opportunities for virtuous activity, the rich also make reality more beautiful and gain both gratitude and recognition. In contrast to contemporary ostentation, which only earns envy and accumulates resentment, the artful use of money brings together rich, poor and the wise as they jointly bring about the greater glory of the polis. Here again, knowing the true *telos* of money, as a means to serve the literal commonwealth of the polis, elevates politics above economics and even attaches true value to eternally beautiful intangible things outside the market. By culminating in the gift economy and a cosmic vision, high politics rescues men from being permanently opposed to each other over scarce economic goods, pettily denying goods to the poor, and fetishizing wealth. Instead, a tragic culture of sacrificial beauty is born.

The shared experiences of the beautiful, or *kalon*, that Heyking directs us towards also elevate the baser members of the community from pleasure to more lasting and truer experiences. As opposed to hedonism, which is but a way of denying the world and confining oneself to a temporary state of oblivion, the art of politics rightly understood reconciles those ruled by their bodies to the fullness of their humanity and the richness of the complete range of human experience. Once reason is no longer seen as the scout or slave of the passions, and speech is redeemed from the debased tasks of haggling and haranguing, we can even be ready to be friends with ourselves. Even though Augustine angrily denounced the very possibility of this virtue of *sophrosune* or self-knowledge, in the name of a predestining god who knows us better than we know ourselves<sup>41</sup>, the playful and loving philosopher’s god refuses to traffic in this deleterious drug of self-hatred.

We may best understand the role Heyking accords to storytelling in politics by contrasting it to Augustine’s denial that human history has any meaning; this is also consistent with the Bishop’s view that the state is a punishment for sin.<sup>42</sup> Even if Augustine is only opposing the triumphal post-Constantinian Christianity of Eusebius, or the earlier pompous patriotism of Cicero, both propagandistic narratives that reek of patriarchal piety, he neglects to

entertain the possibility of a story that teaches a people to participate vicariously in and then learn from the errors and sins of its own past. Such a tragic tale is in a position to clarify and differentiate what the past had made compact and clichéd; it can also educate both desire and reason by being told in a way that neither bores nor blasphemous.

### Polis

We find that mythic storytelling rightly practiced takes us to a primal archetypal space from where both individual soul and collective citizenry may observe the eternal struggle to orient the human soul towards what is truly divine and noble. Neither the Roman obsession with immortal worldly glory nor a virtue hating and world-despising faith seeking deferred gratification for its wager on the afterlife can offer fulfillment to either psyche or polis. As neither outlook fully grasps the tension between the eternal and the temporal realms a soul must shuttle between to fulfill its nature, we must study Greek tragedy to see how a culture keeps in contact with its founding myths and irrational roots, while yet renewing them as it goes through history. This synthesis of religion and celebration is what we seek.

Heyking brings up Schelling's brilliant insight: 'nations do not make myths, myths make nations.'<sup>43</sup> As our Christian myths have replaced Logos with a *Soter* or savior who only has to be thanked and not thought, the West suffers from an inability to talk to the gods or think about them in a way that befits our souls; neither can we come to terms with the furies from our past. This means that Western culture, despite its technical achievements, is no longer about reasons or persons. In such a context, it is no wonder that blood and money are appealed to as the ultimate criteria of value. We are dominated and denigrated by giants of our own making, corporations and computers that lack any capacity to grasp the value of human life and reduce all to profit and power even as they supposedly serve us. We thus find ourselves cut off from each other and alienated from nature in an absurd media-ruled underworld that very much resembles Plato's famous Cave.

It is clear that, even though we are individually and collectively responsible for this incarceration, mankind lacks both the will and the desire to liberate itself. While we no longer know ourselves, as a result of the soul-denying excesses of god-obsessed religion, our attempts at liberation from theocracy and patriarchy only resulted in a vulgar materialism that has now spawned a violent and hubristic technological culture that threatens to destroy the earth itself; this new ontology denies anything that cannot be weighed and measured or justified as pleasure. Now, no longer able to trust ourselves, each another or reality, we (along with our planet) are on the verge of being torn apart by our blind and insatiate desires. Was Heidegger right to say only a god could save us?<sup>44</sup> But wasn't it religion, followed by inept efforts at emulating an absent god, that got us in this mess?

The specific god Heyking turns to is Hermes, the very deity whose task it is to lead souls to the underworld and mediate between the divine and human realms. As the youngest god and the patron of liars, tricksters and travellers, he is least at home in Olympus, preferring to frequent threshold or liminal situations and, unlike Apollo, who jealously defends sacred boundaries and Dionysus who angrily destroys all of them, Hermes passes through boundaries while leaving them intact.<sup>45</sup> Hermes is the god most interested in the human soul's polymorphous perversity and transgressive tendencies. His erotic nature comes to the aid of souls sent on impossible missions or heroes placed in perverse plights. As the daimonic son of

Maia (illusion) and Zeus, Hermes is also able to see through deceptions that hold humans captive; better yet, in combining the mastery of appearances and mass communication, he goes about decoding riddles and dispelling or deconstructing dogmas of dubious derivation deployed to make a demos hold itself hostage and alienate souls from their own daimonic potential.

### **Polis**

While Nietzsche saw Dionysus as the patron of men such as Machiavelli and Hobbes who railed against the corruption of reason and the soul by the Church, we must not forget that these rebels opposed Aristotle and, by extension, Apollo, both of whom stood for a radiant rationality of false solar clarity. This monistic outlook blinds the soul and bleaches the mind, as it offers a gift of divine reason that will shortly become scholasticism and then artificial intelligence. This is why we need Hermes, who now enters the false dichotomy between Apollo and Dionysus. By his first self-proving act of divine virtuosity, the patron of cattle thieves resists all those who rule men as cattle and count men as if they were cattle, *even when they seek to liberate the herds from their shepherds!* By routing shepherd *and* wolves, Hermes exposes a darker deception under the bifurcation into good and evil. Through him, by twilight, a friend mystically sees my differentiated potential as myself; he saves souls from the trivial choices Aristotle offers: abstract aloofness, mimetic mediocrity and slavish subservience are but three ways of hiding the ultimate particular from itself. ‘O gods, for the recognition of friends is a god.’<sup>46</sup>

Unlike a lover, who only ultimately views the best version of his own self in and through the beloved, the Hermes-inspired friend unselfishly sees the unique soul of the befriended one in all of its uncanny and tragic potential. What is seen is not my eternal form or divine essence but what is most fury-ridden and god-haunted about me; only these energies can propel my soul out of its own underworld and towards the divine siren voices that promise a restless psyche self-knowledge and recognition. In other words, unlike Aristotle’s *Noos*, which only knows a soul according to its biologic “nature” via timeless knowledge of its species, or even the god of Augustine, who, hippo-like, wallows in the soul’s unconscious and preys on its darkest urges, a friend is the way by which Hermes appears to us in our fullest and most unique psychic particularity. Meeting and abiding with us at eventide, wherever two friends and three paths join, he comes and goes even when the one bringing the windfall is not aware the god is using him. Further, a Hermes-led friend’s entry in the life of a young person is often viewed in malefic terms by the family or cave he belonged to; Hermes seems to rob this ethical substance of its once innocent and undifferentiated class member. This form of so-called Socratic corruption, leads us to actively observe and challenge what had previously been ignored or held to be sacred. Simply put, the friend rescues a lost soul from the underworld of tribal or pre-political life and forces it to engage and interpret the very symbols that had previously contained its erotic motion.

### **Conclusion**

Let me state, even more bluntly, that the polytheistic cosmos described here has to do with specific innate powers and gifts unique to individual souls. It is obvious that some have musical skills while others are supremely gifted only at selling bad music; likewise some may be mathematically adept and others, such as Einstein, have creative powers that both inspire and need the aid of mathematicians. In an apocalyptic situation, where the form of the world is

passing away, we would all be well advised to let Christ to be formed in us; but a world that is much in need of creativity and genius must respect unique powers of soul and not allow them to be stifled by tradition, modesty, humility and obedience. This is why, even while Hermes may be disguised as a rogue or smuggler, even as a spiritual pimp, we must honor his godly power to rescue lost souls, solve riddles and reconcile foes.

But how is Hermes summoned? And how to make the great leap from friendship to politics? Let us answer the second question first. While we cannot go from oligarchic friendship to democratic politics, neither the soul nor the city is what it should be when Eros is denounced and disarmed while the soul is chained and blinded. While Augustinian Christianity casts a dark shadow of sin over the soul, using self-accusatory categories worthy of Job's Satan in denouncing the soul's erotic motion as concupiscence and finding self-knowledge to be both impossible and sinful, even a Christianized Aristotle has the Apollonian arrogance of a bright blinding eye in the sky as it claims to be one with the divine mind. But this is the wisdom of Lucifer. It is a false omniscience that cannot stand imperfection or see that men learn to love by suffering and gain insight from errors. In denying the soul's erotic motion, this logic of perfection hides an evil that must be unmasked; it is insufficient to know or treat most humans as if they were but members of an animal species that needs moderate role models to mobilize their mimetic nature. Only the self-identity gained from friendship can give us the virtues of citizens.

While civic friendship must be defined in a way that affirms its aristocratic origins, generous spirit and moderate desires, democracy cannot be allowed to remain a negative Dionysian power, susceptible to demagogic rage. Dionysus' rage is only appeased every soul's potential is recognized, and not denied because of sin or poverty. Instead of preferring the stability of order to the volatility of justice, true politics must be seen as being about virtue and the good life. We must face what Plato shows in the *Symposium* where Aristophanes surgically reduces Eros to sex, thumos and 'family values.'<sup>47</sup> Jealously loving one's own kind, *pace* Freud and Strauss, cannot be called truly erotic. This is where the Platonic and pre-Roman Christian emphasis on love as other-directed comes up against the older Judeo-Roman focus on family, tribe and other anti-political oligarchic substances. Mores valuing gravity over grace are opposed to the tragic city and gift economy.

As a side-effect of the rediscovery of soul that comes from the study of friendship, we find that gods that do not treat men unfairly because they are arbitrary; since our souls are not the same, we can and do respond to the gods in different ways. As the Athenian stranger saw, the soul is 'most one's own'<sup>48</sup> and 'a most divine thing.'<sup>49</sup> By using the fullest implications of these insights we may gain a sense of (a) the nature of the cosmos itself and (b) what sort of polis we should inhabit. If the soul is most our own, it cannot be controlled by gods or rulers and, as a most divine thing, the soul is that aspect of us which can respond to divine challenges. In short, the soul is not made by the gods or formed by a polis but must be raised in an ethos that values friendship and trust over coercion and suspicion. The final task is replacing nature's strife and the near-sighted despotism of a tyrant or god, however benign, with friendship as the basic political principle; this avowal brings the *kalon* of the cosmos out of nature and into the psychic and political orders, for only in a soul or polis can friendship be chosen deliberately for itself. Now, many millennia later, while we are still far from realizing this goal, it is still moving to see the *Laws* state these truths for the first time. We may now call friendship the form of politics and name the oligarchic substances of family, piety and money on the right and demagogic anarchy

on the left as the two toxic extremes threatening it.

Heyking studies the ‘minimum doctrine’ of the *Laws* about gods and men with a view to protecting human friendship and true politics from nihilistic and/or pessimistic doctrines that are injurious to the human spirit. While we must be protected from false gods, sacred but toxic traditions about world, flesh and devil that hold peoples hostage in cultural caves and deny individual souls self-knowledge, it is just as vital that this law be the basis for defining how a man or nation should relate to ultimate reality; while often the strongest opposition to human liberation comes from others who persist in unnecessarily oppositional patterns of piety and parochialism, we must also confront real fears about what lies outside the cave. Are these gods or forces of nature friendly, hostile or indifferent to us? If the gods are not friendly, and reality is meaningless, is there good reason to feel that other humans and nature should be treated with suspicion and spite?

This ‘minimum doctrine’ affirms that the gods exist, are not aloof from the good and cannot be corrupted.<sup>50</sup> Since these large claims are surely linked to the claims earlier made by the Athenian Stranger of the soul’s divine nature, it appears that we should fall back on our experience of friendship for a non-scientific proof that begins with the assumption implicit in speech that humans can and will share and understand the truth. This gift of the logos is the province of Hermes and the god, whom we summon by speech or writing whenever we need to understand each other, is thus already in our midst wherever words are spoken. But perhaps we can go further and say that men only understand even themselves by speech; self-consciousness itself gains content and character by this gift of the gods. The most famous instance of this is the time when Hermes met Odysseus while he was becalmed on the island of Circe. The god rescues the outlawed hero from being reduced to bestiality and worse by making him the gift of Moly;<sup>51</sup> in other words he uproots Odysseus’ soul from its furies and follies and gives it to him. Hermes, who earlier ended the *Iliad* by ensuring that Hector would receive a heroic funeral and undying fame, miraculously saving his reputation from the ugly way of his death just as Apollo saved his body from the earth and dust Dionysian Achilles dragged him through,<sup>52</sup> now helps Odysseus detach himself from his own lies, which he had begun to believe, stripping off Achilles’ armor and his own claims to be nobody/pure mind or the great sacker of Troy, and prepare to come home as his aged weather-beaten self. It is thus through Hermes that Odysseus and his patron goddess Athena are reconciled. They had become estranged by his hubristic efforts to assume the identities and appetites of Achilles and Ares.

We now see how Hermes can aid a culture as it strives to regain contact with the gods and its roots. Hermes does what we cannot do by our own efforts; as Homer said when Odysseus got the Moly, ‘it is impossible for men to dig up, but gods have the power to do all things.’<sup>53</sup> The god helped self-deceiving Odysseus unchain himself from bondage to his own lies in a cave of his own making. Hermes, by whom one friend helps another to see himself, also saves cultures, helping them to uproot the hidden true essence from what was added by parents, priests or princes and falsely made sacred. The best example is from Christianity. Originally a community of friends, it first preached God’s love for the poor, oppressed, weak and ritually unclean and defended their humanity against a corrupt priesthood and the sadistic Roman Empire. Then, after three centuries as a successful church, it abruptly became the official religion of the Empire and gained all the trappings of theocracy. Despite Jesus’ words denying family, even his own, love and friendship were replaced by patriarchal Roman family values, canon law was used to sanctify slavery, sexism, simony and anti-Semitism, and Christ’s message of love was

buried in a cave of lies, errors and mistranslations. While Jesus and his followers lived as part of the City of God, the post-Nicene Church, ironically through Augustine's work, was reconciled to the City of Man.

Transcending both Apollo's proud piety and Dionysus' destructive rage, opposed thumotic forces that sustain each other, Hermes helps a culture see itself anew. Revealing what is essential about a tradition, he smiling separates its soul from its embodiment amidst a myriad of mistakes, lapses and errors that fill the cave; once reminders of past encounters with the transcendent, they are literalized, ritualized and furiously sanctified to the point of blocking the citizens' access to the Agathon in the present. These shades are as jealously guarded by the old and pious as they are angrily assailed by the young and poor, who see their absurdity as proof of atheism. The truth, as comic to gods as it is tragic to man, is that the quest for certainty, order and substance leads men from virtue and honor to family, wealth and corruption. The later books of Plato's *Republic* show us how a just unstable tragic polis is betrayed for "solider" post-political regimes. In this process, the soul is alienated from the cosmos and trapped in its own Hell.

By inspiring heroes to leave the cave, grapple with the gods and then return with rich eyes and empty hands, Hermes makes it possible for tired old symbols to be revered, recognized and rehabilitated in a way that seals the bond between old and young and puts the souls of the aged in motion. It is possible at last for hero and bard to be friends and engage in mythic storytelling that unifies the city.

In sum, this book is an inspired and evocative account of friendship's triadic and open-ended nature. Friendship is not a hermetically sealed bond between two that confirms self-serving views held in common and sets them apart from rabble and reality alike; rather it is a daimonic event, uniting the divine and human parts of reality, and opening us up to the tragic beauty of the Agathon. This experience fills us with erotic generosity towards others; this is how the prisoner leaves the cave and why he returns, as a philosopher, to free souls, find friends and restore the polis. By friendship we practice true politics and reverse the cosmos towards justice. The view that *philia* activates the soul, sparks a polity into being, and brings the Cosmos into sight, is at least as reasonable as the regnant belief that selfish egotistic behavior is best for the economy and even helps nature evolve.

Heyking's reminder that politics must begin with shared admiration of all that is noble and beautiful in this world saves us from the cynicism and misanthropy of many political theorists and points the soul towards its true *telos*. The next best thing to being in a city where all good are truly happy is the happiness gained from being part of building a city where those who suffer for justice can enjoy true friendship. Although the soul can never justify its tragic but loving career to its fearful and needy body, any more than Socrates could persuade Crito, choosing friends, city and cosmos over family, wealth and economy can be shown to consistent and reasonable, especially if we know reason to be more than the slave of desire.

This is why Plato's minimum doctrine cannot be proven to one who expects the gods to provide him with many children, much wealth and innumerable flocks of sheep. To one who values his soul and friends, on the other hand, a generous life of tragic fulfillment is readily chosen over comic pleasure, fruitful multiplication or violent acquisition. But even unenforced, this minimum doctrine must stifle any religion claiming the gods are aloof, irrational, legalistic or open to bribes. The minimum doctrine also must be supported by corresponding reforms in the city and views about the soul. As noted earlier, the polis can offer the chance for a good life in a

gift economy to all, as long as they look to the Agathon and do not live at the economic level, frenziedly accumulating scarce resources and seeking to be envied. Men seeking happiness in this way are forever trapped in Hades.

This leaves the last word to be about soul, an entity denied by the materialist, smothered by the Jansenist or turned into a winged fairy by the spiritualist. It is in keeping with the spirit of Heyking's book that we declare Hermes to be the patron of the soul. It is through him that the soul makes friends in the true sense, and gets power to redeem its furies, slip its underworldly bonds, and see itself. This is why denying souls or a people freedom or education for religious, economic or racial reasons sins against the Spirit. If Plato (and Vico) are right, souls can rise (aided by Hermes) to wrestle with the gods and bring new meaning to the cave. Heyking's daimonic work demonstrates this power. It is up to us to join him and restore soul and *philia* to their rightful place in our blind, biased and beleaguered body politic.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Heyking, 12
- <sup>2</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra I*, 188.
- <sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics* X.7, VIII.7
- <sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, II.3
- <sup>5</sup> Defined in Federici, 207
- <sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, I.10
- <sup>7</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 508e
- <sup>8</sup> Heyking, xiii
- <sup>9</sup> Von Heyking, 22
- <sup>10</sup> Forster, E.M. "What I Believe" 1938
- <sup>11</sup> Von Heyking, 42
- <sup>12</sup> *Luke* 24:13-35
- <sup>13</sup> Von Heyking, 3
- <sup>14</sup> Von Heyking, 4
- <sup>15</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan Part 1*, xiii.14
- <sup>16</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.4
- <sup>17</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.15
- <sup>18</sup> Von Heyking, 7
- <sup>19</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 203a
- <sup>20</sup> Voegelin 2002, 325-6
- <sup>21</sup> Von Heyking, 5
- <sup>22</sup> Von Heyking, 188
- <sup>23</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, 1.9
- <sup>24</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.4
- <sup>25</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan Part 1*, xi.1
- <sup>26</sup> Goethe, *Faust Part 1*, 1338
- <sup>27</sup> Von Heyking, 8
- <sup>28</sup> Homer, *Odyssey*, IX 1-12
- <sup>29</sup> Homer, *Odyssey*, XXI 210-224
- <sup>30</sup> Heyking, 99
- <sup>31</sup> *Matthew* 3:9
- <sup>32</sup> Voegelin 1997, 131
- <sup>33</sup> Voegelin 1997, 135
- <sup>34</sup> Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, preface #28
- <sup>35</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, VIII.3

- <sup>36</sup> Defined in Federici, 212-13  
<sup>37</sup> Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, III.2.77-78  
<sup>38</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra III*, 270  
<sup>39</sup> Heyking, 55  
<sup>40</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, IV.1-2  
<sup>41</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.4  
<sup>42</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.15  
<sup>43</sup> Von Heyking, 89  
<sup>44</sup> Heidegger, *Der Spiegel*, 31 May 1976  
<sup>45</sup> Von Heyking, 118  
<sup>46</sup> Euripides, *Helen*, 560  
<sup>47</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 190c-191d  
<sup>48</sup> Plato, *Laws*, 726a  
<sup>49</sup> Plato, *Laws*, 728b  
<sup>50</sup> Plato, *Laws*, 885b  
<sup>51</sup> Homer, *Odyssey*, X.275 ff.  
<sup>52</sup> Homer, *Iliad* XXIV. 15-20  
<sup>53</sup> Homer, *Odyssey* X.305

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